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Since the post-cold war era, West Africa has been experiencing violent intra- state conflicts which 
have escalated to extreme levels and lasted over decades at a time, which led to serious security threats 
in the region.  ECOWAS, created initially with an objective of promoting economic integration and 
development in West Africa, amended its mandate to include conflict management. Since its 
establishment, ECOWAS has engaged in several interventions in its member states, of which Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and The Gambia are part and were researched in this study. 
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate ECOWAS and its regional conflict prevention strategies, 
as well as make inquiries into ECOWAS’ policies for reducing security threats in the region. 
 
The study employed a qualitative approach to identify the similarities and differences between these 
three interventions; to determine the challenges faced in each intervention and to determine if 
ECOWAS took measures to address these challenges prior to subsequent interventions.  
 
The findings of the study showed that the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which occurred in 
the early 1990’s, had similar causes, such as subdivisions among ethnicities, extreme political 
marginalization, poor democratic management and economic hardship. In both cases, the UN had to 
intervene before the conflicts could be resolved. Unlike the first two conflicts, the Gambian conflict 
occurred due to years of authoritative governance and major electoral misconduct in 2016.  
 
During the first two interventions, ECOWAS was presented with major challenges but through 
Protocol’s Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-
Keeping and Security, ECOWAS managed to address some issues. The findings of the study also 
revealed that during the intervention in The Gambia, ECOWAS portrayed a high level of conflict 
prevention skills, showing that it had addressed the challenges faced in the past and was ready to 
conduct mediations and interventions without the aid of the UN. ECOWAS continues to implore new 
methods of conflict prevention, monitoring and resolution to promote regional development, 
democracy and good governance.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. Research design 
1.1 Introduction 
Conflict is a rampant phenomenon in many African societies. The continuous presence of conflict 
brings about disregard for the law, destruction of property, loss of lives, human rights violations and 
displacement of citizens. Intrastate wars have been a common form of conflict in West Africa even 
prior to the 1990’s. Intrastate conflicts were experienced in many countries including but not limited 
to Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Somalia, etc. and these conflicts that occurred towards the conclusion of the Cold War, were 
referred to as ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2007, 6-10). Wallensteen and Sollenberg (2000, 648) describe 
intra-state conflict as “a violent civil unrest between government and non-government entities over 
disputed incompatibility with the use of armed forces which results in at least twenty-five battle 
related death per annum”. Previous research has revealed that these conflicts are brought about by 
various reasons. Ali (2000), suggests that the causes of conflicts in Africa, to an extent, can be credited 
to historical factors regarding slave trade and colonialism, interventions in the internal affair of 
African states brought about by economic factors, interferences by local bodies motivated by 
capturing the state and controlling monetary reserves, ethnic disparities and human rights violations. 
Further research revealed causes including poverty and unemployment, as well as cultural and 
religious diversity (Bujara, 2002).  
The rate of development in the region is correlated to the level of security. Robert McNamara, the 
U.S. Security of Defense, addressed the relationship between development and security, expressing 
that in a modern society, security means development but without the presence of development, 
security cannot exist. Security is not expressed through the presence of military hardware, military 
force or traditional military activity though it may include it. It can be concluded that the absence of 
security brings about a standstill in development and the lack of development in a region increases 
the risk of violence. Looking at West Africa, the need for progress in economic growth is vital but 
the rise in violence and conflict in the region has brought about major concerns over future 
development (UNDP in Africa, 2018).  
There have been studies reporting that since the beginning of the new millennium, there has been a 
massive decline in the occurrence of civil war in West Africa, suggesting a decline in large-scale 
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political violence and an overall drop in violence (Straus 2012). However, this analogy is not exactly 
correct, as incidents of civil war have simply been replaced by various forms of political violence, 
including drug trafficking, electoral violence and religious extremism (Marc, Verjee and Mogaka, 
2015). 
So, with the never-ending cycle of security issues since the Cold War ended, continental and regional 
organizations were prompted, through collective security mechanisms, to develop joint strategies 
aimed at preventing and maintaining peace.  
One of the first collective security organizations, the United Nations (UN), was established on the 
24th of October 1945, with the goal of maintaining international peace and security by implementing 
principles of justice, settlements of international disputes and international law as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. The UN played an active part in resolving 
interstate conflicts during the Cold War. Unfortunately, with the shifting nature of disputes and 
amendments in the political arena, the UN’s role started to change. Throughout the Cold War, the 
world found itself trapped between two superpowers, i.e. either under US or the Soviet influence. 
This division was also present among UN member states causing a divide within the organization, 
which even led to proxy like wars in developing countries (Cassese, 2005, 323). With the UN 
becoming more preoccupied with maintaining its status quo within the international world and less 
willing to play a role in resolving new and reoccurring conflicts (Paris, 2004, 15), organizations 
within the region, for example, the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS), 
was motivated to step up and assume a principal role in upholding security within the region.  
ECOWAS, which was created on May 28th, 1975 after the Lagos Treaty signing, was initially 
established for economic development. The first provision aimed at sustaining security and peace in 
the region was made in 1978 when ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA), which 
was preceded the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense (1981) (Butchard, Kuwali and 
Viljoen, 2015, 252). These Protocols were targeted at addressing security issues during the cold war, 
took the form of interstate conflicts rather than intrastate (Chambas, 2007). ECOWAS’ first attempt 
in peacekeeping was in Liberia, followed by Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote D’Ivoire. After 
every intervention, ECOWAS was said to have evaluated its performance and undertaken various 
actions to improve its approach and efficiency in securing peaceful resolutions of conflicts but from 
a report published in 2005 on ECOWAS Peacekeeping operations between 1990-2004, it shows that 
ECOWAS’ only legal basis for operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, to a large 
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extent, was the protocol on Non-Aggression (1978), and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in 
Defense in (1981). The Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was only adopted on December 10th, 1999, almost twenty 
years after the last protocol. This in addition to reoccurring issues of poor financing of interventions, 
lack of command and control on the ground and an overall lack of ample consensus among member 
states, shows that despite ECOWAS’ obvious transformation, interests and successes in managing 
regional crises, not much significant structural improvement was achieved during its first few 
interventions (ECOWAS, 2005).  
Nevertheless, ECOWAS, until date, is a revolutionary regional organization and according to Fleitz 
(2002), interventions conducted by ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau were the 
most significant non-UN peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS has brought about a realization that 
sustainable structures for peace management can be developed and implemented by Africans, an 
underlining idea that highlight the notion of African solutions to African problems, a core motivation 
for this thesis.  
The issue of sub-regional peacekeeping operations has peaked the interest of many scholars of politics 
in Africa as well as political observers from different areas. The information available on the 
ECOWAS peacekeeping operations during the first-generation interventions, i.e. interventions in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, is much more than research on ECOWAS interventions in 
Senegal, Mali and Gambia. In my opinion, this can be attributed to the fact that these conflicts are 
more current and also the rapidly growing nature of terrorism in West Africa. This has created a gap 
which has made it unclear to what extent ECOWAS has improved its security mechanism since 1989. 
Thus, a study in this area will prove conceptually significant, as it will contribute to already existing 
literature on regional interventions of ECOWAS and help create additional academic focus of the 
systematic development of peacekeeping in the region.   
Therefore, this thesis seeks to carry out a comparative analysis of ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Gambia with the purpose of evaluating how these interventions differed from each 
other in terms of their strengths, limitations and strategies, as well as evaluate if ECOWAS has 
modified its security mechanism to suit the nature of conflicts taking place today. In addition, this 
thesis endeavors to determine if ECOWAS is currently in the position to conduct military operations 
unilaterally.  
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1.2 Problem statement 
The Liberian intervention was the first major intervention conducted by ECOWAS. It was carried out 
under difficult circumstances. Despite huge support from Nigeria, there were many challenges 
involved, such as lack of military equipment, poor logistics, disagreements among member states and 
language barriers. Troops sent for the intervention, arrived not properly prepared, i.e. without 
adequate supply of equipment and a poor understanding of the territory. During this conflict, there 
were major misunderstandings between the Anglophone and Francophone members of ECOWAS. 
Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire questioned the legitimacy and the neutrality of ECOMOG. In 
addition, some member states, especially Burkina Faso, showed great support for the principle of 
non-interventionism in local affairs of ECOWAS member states.  
In 1997 in Sierra Leone, a military junta overthrew president Kabbah’s government and declared the 
creation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Kabbah appealed to ECOWAS for 
military intervention. Initial attempts of removing the junta failed, so Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops 
were deployed from Liberia to Sierra Leone and managed to reverse the effects of the coup, however 
this did not end the terrible civil war currently in its 7th year. During this crisis, ECOWAS also faced 
many challenges. Similar to the Liberian civil war, the anglophone and francophone divisions affected 
cooperation within the military in Sierra Leone. ECOWAS inability to resolve the anglophone-
francophone divide before engaging in an intervention in Sierra Leone, brought about the formation 
of several alliances based on ideological and linguistic similarities, as well as similar state interests. 
ECOWAS military response to Sierra Leones crisis didn’t just cause a bipolarity, i.e. anglophone vs. 
francophone but rather a multipolar structure, the third group being led by states that had complete 
disregard for third party intervention.   
The third intervention being analyzed is the intervention in The Gambia caused by decades of bad 
government and the 2016 Presidential electoral misconduct. Unlike the interventions discussed 
above, this ECOWAS intervention was carried out over twenty years later. The purpose for which 
this intervention was chosen is to demonstrate the level of development within the ECOWAS regional 
body. This intervention faced certain challenges, as every intervention does but those challenges were 
nothing compared to the level of commitment and organization carried out by member states and the 
international community. There was mutual understanding between francophone and anglophone 
states, complete regional and international compliance and support for prevention of a civil war, as 
well as well-structured conflict prevention strategies from ECOWAS.  
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These three interventions were carried out by ECOWAS but ensued during different periods and 
under different circumstances. The interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were carried out around 
the time of the cold war. They were the first major interventions conducted by ECOWAS and based 
on these interventions, additional ECOWAS protocols and conventions were drawn up and enforced. 
The Gambian intervention showed a higher level of confidence and preparedness by ECOWAS, with 
well-trained troops, regional backing and international support.  
Research work has been done by scholars on the process of ECOWAS and ECOMOG interventions 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but not much analysis has been done on the Gambian situation since this 
intervention occurred rather recently. Therefore, this thesis seeks to conduct a comparative analysis 
of the three interventions, to establish how ECOWAS intervention strategies have changed over the 
years.  
The aim of this thesis is to highlight the process of democratic consolidation and conflict 
management, which required inputs and assistance of many actors. It will evaluate the interventions 
carried out by ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone and The Gambia to compare different ECOWAS 
interventions and identify the challenges that ECOWAS encountered. Furthermore, this thesis will 
evaluate if any action was taken by ECOWAS based on previous interventions, to improve future 
conflict management.  
In addition to the above, research and findings regarding The Gambia, will be presented as a recount 
of past political regimes and their developments. The aim of this is to provide a timeline of events 
leading to the ECOWAS intervention that also highlight the drastic differences in the methods of 
governance within The Gambia.  
The final chapters will contain references regarding future ECOWAS interventions and suitable 
practices.  
This research questions are as follows: 
• What were the differences and similarities between the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia 
(1989-1997), Sierra Leone (1997-2002) and The Gambia (2016-2017)?  
• What were the challenges faced by ECOWAS during these interventions?  
• Where there any steps taken to address the challenges ECOWAS encountered during these 
peacekeeping processes?  
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1.3 Theoretical framework 
This thesis is supported by the evolving concept of regional security and third-party intervention. 
As predicted by Wallensteen (1992), the end of the cold war brought with it an intensification of 
armed state conflicts, with internal conflicts having constituted a majority of them, in addition, the 
level of initiative from international organizations such as the UN to conduct peace missions declined 
drastically creating a challenge to international peace and regional security.  
To better understand the underlining issues that drive the actions of regional organizations and to 
better understand their practices and challenges, the concept of security and region have to be briefly 
looked at. Various literature will define these two concepts in many ways, but for the purpose of this 
thesis, it will be enough to indicate which definition will be used here.  
Here, security/securitization is referred to as not just the absence of a threat but also the ability of a 
nation and its people to manage said threat efficiently and democratically. Region/regionalization is 
referred to as a particular geographical location where social interaction takes place between a certain 
number of states. These two concepts are vital to the way we perceive regional and state notions of 
security within the West African context (Iwilade and Agbo, 2012). 
After the Cold War, the bipolar struggle between the Soviet and American blocs gave way to a rather 
complex form of international relationships. With the birth of newly independent states, the rise in 
globalization and nationalism, the world was no longer divided into opposing blocs. Opinions of this 
new global system varied, however, this new global system was not to be considered a disaster, as 
independent states posed no threat to globalization and globalization only brought about a more 
extensive intercultural interaction, which led to a greater global consciousness as argued by 
Sabanadze (2010). All these ultimately being a more profound experience than the bipolar divide with 
the fundamental goal of diving rather than uniting the globe. 
These structural changes in the global system and the pressure it placed on states, driving them to unit 
together, brought about many complex changes including the destruction of the Westphalian states 
system and the encouragement of independent and exclusive rule (Iwilade and Agbo, 2012). This 
eventually also led to a change in the fundamental idea of third-party intervention.  
The manner in which third-parties are now required or expected to act does not always conform with 
previous forms of intervention. Traditional peacekeeping consists of fundamental principles such as 
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impartiality, the minimum use of force and consent. Firstly, traditional peacekeeping requires 
continues consent of the host state. Secondly, peacekeepers are expected to remain impartial to all 
conflicting parties and finally, peacekeeping ought to not require the use of force (the threat of force). 
The only instance in which force can be used is in the case of self-defense (UN Peacekeeping 
operations, 2008). Several scholars have criticized the practicality of the traditional peacekeeping 
principles, whereas others have argued that external involvement in a state’s affairs could cause more 
complexity and even create new conflict, thus implying that peacekeeping strategies should continue 
to follow the traditional principles.   
Tharoor (1995) was of the opinion that that the goal should not be to return to traditional principals 
but to redefine them as there is a high demand for a stronger conceptual framework for peacekeeping 
today. Adhering only to the old way would only depict the international community as one that has 
turned its back on human suffering as it is virtually impossible to successfully ensure that all three 
principles of traditional peacekeeping in every conflict today. This in effect leads to the 
noncompliance of Article 1 of the UN Charter, which is to maintain international peace and security… 
and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and 
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace.  
How a civil war or conflict ends can really determine the level of development after the conflict. More 
recent studies have shown that, the participation of a third parties in conflicts, on humanitarian 
grounds through the UN, positively impact post-war political and social development (Fortna 2008). 
Third parties enabling implementation and monitoring of more practical means of demobilization and 
disarmament (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). In addition, UN intervention can allow for developmental 
aid for the purposes of reconstructing health and school facilities (Howard 2008). Despite the positive 
aspects of third-party interventions, it is necessary to mention that they can influence a conflict in 
order to attain personal goals or objectives. Chang, Potter, and Sanders created a theory that is 
consistent with third party objectives. It demonstrates that if a party is content with the status quo, it 
is more likely to put a stop to rebellious activity but if this third party is interested in changing the 
status quo, then effort could be made to encourage a rebellious behavior. This proposed theoretical 
result shows that the intervening party is loyal to its national interests and effectively has the power 
to shift the dynamics of a conflict (Chang, Potter, and Sanders, 954-974). Since 1944, 94 out of 97 
civil conflicts in which third parties intervened, faced biased intervention strategies. 7 conflicts faced 
both neutral and biased approaches and 10 experienced neutral interventions (Regan 2002, 53-73). 
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Fisher and Keashly (1990) addressed this issue by creating a taxonomy of the primary methods of 
intervention with the goal of bring some clarity to the unclear distinction between traditional peace 
mediation and newer forms of third-party intervention. They also developed a contingency model for 
third-party intervention. This was based off the earlier work of Friedrich Glasl (1982) and Hugo Prein 
(1984). “Our model matches the lead or initial third-party intervention to the stage of conflict 
escalation, i.e. to the particular mix of objective and subjective factors” (Fisher and Keashly 1991). 
Their four-stage model of escalation captured many of the objective and subjective elements that are 
known to be vital as a conflict becomes more intense and the opposing parties are willing to resort to 
more antagonistic measures in order to win.  
Based on the four-stage model, namely, discussion, polarization, segregation, destruction, a 
contingency model was proposed. The contingency model consists of methods that allow for an 
increase and expansion of types of power given to third-party interveners, in parallel to the parties’ 
actions to escalate influence (Fisher and Keashly, 1990). The level of tactics, commitments, and 
investments depicted by opposing parties to a conflict would demand an equal level of, if not stronger, 
larger means of impact and approval by third-party interveners. This will help persuade opposing 
parties to essentially reevaluate the situation and reconsider their approach to the ongoing conflict.  
According to Fisher: 
“The contingency model challenges third parties to always consider carefully the 
approach they are proposing to implement, and to carry out a detailed analysis of 
the conflict before assuming that their method is the most appropriate and useful at 
that point in time. The intention here is … to encourage more traditional interveners 
to examine whether their methods are indeed adequate to meet the specific demands 
that subjectivity and complexity bring to escalated and destructive conflicts, 
regardless of the level of interaction.” (Fisher 2001, 169) 
Traditional methods of peace mediation have been very successful, nevertheless there remains a 
significant amount of room for improvement in this area, both theoretically and practically. While the 
need for a generic theory as a form of guidelines for practical involvement could prove valuable, it 
must be realized that not every conflict will suit the parameters available in the current theoretical 
guidelines. Thus, for a more effective third-party intervention, there should be an allowance for the 
possibly that intervention strategies are contingent on the characteristics of a conflict and along with 
this, regional organizations should have the authority to increase an interventions effectiveness 
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through the combination of traditional and modern forms of intervention (including the threat and use 
of force) where they see fit.  
Therefore, drawing from the above, the role or involvement of a third-party can take different forms 
such as analyzing or discussing the issues in international forums, creating a safe space for direct 
negotiations, demanding a ‘call for action’ or condemnation (that is a demand to end aggressive 
actions), arbitration; which in itself is a more legal form of conflict resolution consisting a settlement 
which is formal and binding, and performed by an arbitration body and implementation of sanctions 
(Diehl, Druckman and Wall, 1998, 33-55).    
1.4 Literature review 
The need for the creation of regional integration schemes focused at promoting cooperation, 
development and conflict resolution in West Africa was a topic of discussion even prior to the 1970’s 
(De Wet, 2014, 355).  
African renaissance and early pan-African philosophers, afro-optimists, which envisioned a new 
millennium referred to as the African century. This ideology came about thanks to international 
political favor and that brought with it relative although limited progress in development on the 
continent. Afro-optimists believed in building sustainable and viable structures, saturated in core 
African values for durable peace and security, which would be owned by the people for the people 
(Itumelenga, 2018, 10-22). The struggle faced by the African people to redefine a new and better 
political agenda were highlighted by Nabudere (2001). Even with growing doubt about Africa’s 
ability to respond constructively to problems and challenges, the newly independent states that shared 
important camaraderie, unified their strengths and developed a collective solidarity. Consequently, 
the African Union, followed by ECOWAS, a regional organization with an initial mandate of 
economic integration were established as instruments for a faster collective growth for Africa. The 
AU’s role was to serve as the continental integrator and ECOWAS under the authority of the AU, as 
a regional organization for West Africa.  
With the rise in regional conflicts, ECOWAS could not fully carry out its mandate to promote 
development in the fields of economics, transportation, industry, infrastructure and energy, thus it 
expands its mandate to include conflict management.   
Osadolor (2011) addresses the topic of development and cooperation. He mentions that the high level 
of interdependency between development and cooperation has caused fundamental principles of 
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maintaining regional peace, security and stability to become inseparable. His ideology brought about 
the evolution of policies on collective security, which began in 1978 starting with the Protocol on 
Non-Aggression, later reinforced by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense.  These Protocols 
were only put to use in the 1990’s when intrastate conflicts began to arise.  
The Liberian crisis has been referred to by several authors, as the crisis that affirmed the need for the 
presence of a regional conflict management organization. Agbu (2006) revisits the current 
mechanisms of conflict resolution within the sub-region with an idea of adopting the peace-building 
strategy, with the notion that this would create an even better sustainable and practical way to prevent 
conflicts in the region. In 1989, when this conflict commenced, the international community not only 
refused to intervene but turn a blind eye to the whole situation. ECOWAS, then a regional economic 
scheme and without ampule knowledge, preparation and expertise, deployed forces known as the 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to Liberia in 1990. Due to the haste with which 
preparations were made for this intervention, ECOWAS was unable to able to attain a level of 
consensus amongst its members on how better to address the situation in Liberia. In addition to this, 
there were issues of lack of financially support, training of troops and equipment and logistical 
problems but the biggest issue was legality surrounding the issue of non-intervention in local matters 
of ECOWAS member states (Aboagye, 1999).  
However, Arthur (2010) outlines several reasons why ECOWAS decided to violate the principle of 
non-intervention. Firstly, an appeal for assistance in an internal conflict was made by the late 
President of Liberia, Samuel Doe-but this appeal was made to Nigeria which then took the issue to 
ECOWAS for consideration. According to a provision in the Protocol on mutual Defense, any request 
for assistance from a member state warranted an intervention. Secondly, there was no interest shown 
by the international community. Last but not the least there was the UN Charter provision on 
collective self-defense in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Finally, there was the issue surrounding 
‘humanitarian intervention’.  
Mamdani (2009) stated that “The end of the cold war has led to a basic shift in international relations 
among states, heralding an international humanitarian order that promises to hold state sovereignty 
accountable to international human rights standards”. Thus, there was an understanding between the 
principles of responsibility to protect (R2P) and the principles of ‘humanitarian intervention’ that 
sovereignty does not equal abuse. Despite all these valid reasons, questions regarding legal 
justification on the intervention were raised as ECOWAS never sort permission from the UN Security 
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Council before the intervention. The UN Charter authorized ECOMOG in October of 1992 under 
chapter VIII of the UN Charter.  
There have been many opposing views by authors regarding the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. 
Some classify it as a complete failure due to the lack of understanding among member states and 
reliance on international support., whereas others praise their efforts. In spite of all the challenges 
ECOWAS faced during the crisis intervention in Liberia it still managed to achieve the goal, which 
was to provide security to civilians in Liberia.  
The ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone continued straight after the intervention in Liberia. 
During the crisis intervention in Liberia, ECOWAS did not have a permanent security framework 
which left the organization very ill equipped to deal with peacekeeping missions. In addition to not 
having a permanent security framework, there were no clear provisions for dealing with security 
issues. The Protocol on Non-Aggression, which was implemented and signed on the 22nd of April 
1978 in Lagos and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense was implemented and signed in 
Freetown on the 29th of May 1981 were not fully operational and did not grant the organization the 
freedom to intervene in conflicts within the regions. All these issues in addition to not having financial 
supports for missions, no adequate structural organization and lack of well-trained troops left 
ECOWAS at a loss and since the crisis in Sierra Leone took place straight after the crisis in Liberia, 
there was no time to make any dynamic structural changes. As a result, ECOMOG faced much 
difficulty in Sierra Leone.  
According to Arthur (2010), ECOMOG’s deployment to Sierra Leone took place in March 1998 with 
a mission of resorting the democratically elected and legitimate Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who was 
ousted in a military coup, as well as enforcing peace within the rest of the country after a period of 
civil war. Initially, ECOMOG was successful in removing the junta from power but despite their large 
numbers, ECOMOG was poorly equipped and trained to hold off the AFRC/RUF alliance in a guerilla 
conflict. Eventually the rebels forced ECOMOG troops back to Freetown where they never managed 
to gain an upper hand over the rebels. In May 1999, the Lome Peace agreement was signed which not 
only requiring the government to share power with the leaders of the junta but also granting amnesty 
to all participants of the civil war (Kandeh 2003, 192–193). Not long after that Nigeria called its 
troops back home and the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was put together to 
take the place of the vacuum created by the soldiers that left.  
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On a strategic level, Berman and Sams (1998) propose that ECOWAS failed to ensure that the lessons 
learnt from the Liberian intervention were applied, at least to some extent, to Sierra Leone. In addition 
to this, some troops lacked motivation to engage in battle, where others were reported to have taken 
part in illegal diamond trading. 
The role of Nigeria in peace building in the region cannot be under stated, especially regarding the 
role it played in the formation of ECOWAS. Ojakorotu and Adeleke (2018) analyze the hegemonic 
tendencies of Nigeria within West Africa, particularly in ECOWAS. Nigeria’s dominating role within 
ECOWAS was very obvious in both the Liberian crisis and the crisis in Sierra Leone. During both 
interventions, Nigeria provided most of the troops, a majority of the finance and arranged for 
logistical assistance. This created an imbalance within ECOMOG and severe misunderstanding 
between ECOWAS member states. Nigeria assumed a role of authority and often practiced 
performing unilateral decision making. Nigeria’s autonomy was not only felt between member states 
but also among ECOMOG troops. Despite Nigeria possessing the biggest economy and largest 
population in the sub-region, does it really have the necessary economic, military and international 
support needed to assume the position of a hegemonic power in West Africa (Ojakorotu and Adeleke 
2018, 37-53). In addition to this, in a region where the dominant political culture can be considered 
as neopatrimonial, is it safe to say that the political culture guiding the ‘regional hegemon’ will be 
one that present a security culture which prioritizes democracy and human security individually and 
also within ECOWAS (Taylor and Williams, 2008, 137-149). 
Circumstances surrounding the ECOWAS intervention in The Gambia were much different as 
compared to the interventions discussed above. A major factor wasn’t the lack of funding or untrained 
ECOMOG troops but rather the legal justification for an intervention by ECOMOG into Gambia.  
Several hours after Barrow was officially sworn in as the President of The Gambia, on the 19th of 
January 2017, the U.N. Security Council approved the Resolution 2337 (2017). This resolution was 
aimed at forcing Jammeh to step down and declare Barrow as president. Svicevic, in his article, 
‘Military intervention in the Gambia: lessons from the Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone’, 
reflects on the basis for ECOWAS intervention in The Gambia. He believes that the resolution 2337 
(2017) was not the basis on which ECOWAS intervened in Gambia, despite the fact that the language 
used in Resolution 2337 did not expressly prohibit the use of force. Paragraph 6 of the U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 2337 (2017) states that it:   
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“Expresses its full support to the ECOWAS in its commitment to ensure, by political means 
first, the respect of the will of the people of The Gambia as expressed in the results of 1st 
December elections.” 
Here the expression “by political means first” can imply that the use of force could be sort after if 
political means of enforcing the resolution are not successful.  
Svicevic, rather supports the idea presented by De Wet (2014). She suggests that the basis for the 
ECOWAS intervention had more to do with intervention by invitation rather than the lack of strict 
restrictions on the use of force in the resolution 2337.  
She bases this on several actualities; the first being that Resolution 2337 (2017) was not adopted 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Secondly, the that Resolution 2337 (2017) was passed hours 
after President Barrow was inaugurated and around the same time, he requested for immediate 
enforcement to ensure transition of power. This, in addition to the fact that ECOMOG troops, which 
had already surrounded Gambian boarders, only entered after Barrows requests, indicating that the 
most logical legal basis for the ECOWAS military intervention would be ingrained in the values 
depicted in intervention by invitation, rather than “authorization” from Resolution 2337 (2017). Apart 
from the unclear issue of legal basis for intervention, the military intervention in Gambia was very 
successful. Several factors such as considerable international support from the AU, legal mandate to 
impend the use of force, an agreement that ECOWAS troops would cope with the small size of the 
Gambian military, credible commitment from regional leaders such as Nigeria and Senegal and of 
course a general pro-democracy drive in most of Africa played a vital role in the fast and bloodless 
regime change (Hartmann, 2017). In addition to this, it would be safe to say that the experience gained 
from previous interventions definitely contributed towards the level of success achieved. 
The events that took place in Gambia portray a success in terms of democratic transition in Africa, 
proving that peaceful transition of power in Africa is possible. Peaceful democratic transitions are 
reliant on larger nations in the subregion being run by leaders that respect and uphold the rule of law 
(Jackson, 2016). This style of ‘leadership by example’ will force rulers of other states to follow by 
example. If ECOWAS continues to act similarly in the future, member states of ECOWAS attempting 
to hold on to their reign will be forced to think twice.  
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1.5 Research Methodology  
For this research paper, I chose the qualitative content analysis research method. Content analysis is 
a commonly used qualitative research technique, with the purpose of collecting, analyzing and 
extracting meaning from relevant data to allow one to draw realistic and trustworthy conclusions. 
Content analysis has been described by Krippendorff (2004) as “a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.”   
I started by looking into related theories and collecting relevant research data. Then, I proceed to 
critically analyzing and interpreting the collected material. Data consisted of both primary and 
secondary sources. Primary sources included political documents and reports. Secondary sources 
consisted of media reports, news publications and information posted on the United Nations website 
as well as the ECOWAS webpage.  
Apart from primary and secondary sources, additional material was also be analyzed to help create a 
broader picture of the process of conflict intervention. Such material included, but was not limited to, 
articles and journals published by experts in the field of regional security, textbooks, lecture notes, 
online documents and interviews. 
I decided on this method of research because the analysis of previous ECOWAS interventions and 
research on the political and economic structures of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Gambia, can only be 
achieved through exploratory research, which allows one to uncover the trends and underlying 
reasons necessary for a proper development of a hypotheses. This research method is not linked to 
any specific science, therefore there are fewer rules to follow, however issues regarding credibility 
are of the highest importance.  
The pros of this type of research method were; it allowed for a deeper and richer database, did not 
create restrictions as would an interview with limited possibilities for questions and potential bias, it 
was suitable for one with inadequate interpretation skills, therefore errors in interpretation were 
avoided, and it also allowed for the possibility to incorporate different methods of data collection if 
available data was insufficient. The cons were; it did not permit as much human interaction as other 
qualitative research methods would and there could have been the presence of conflicting information 
and unreliable sources of data.  In order to avoid such problems, I based my conclusions on findings 
from reputable sources. Unidentified websites and media reports were accessed for the purpose of 
establishing a general scope of knowledge and not as key sources for my research.  
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My results were collected and compared based on issues such as relationship between member states, 
military readiness for interventions, allocation of funding, logistics, level of neutrality during conflict 
interventions and level of involvement of the international community. 
The maintained the quality of my research by guaranteeing consistency throughout the entire process 
of this study. Consequently, this means that the same results would be obtained if the study were 
conducted by a different researcher.  
A major limitation was my inability to interview anyone related to this issue. Another limitation was 
ensuring that my familiarity and preconceived knowledge of the subject would not affect the 
interpretation of the results. Regarding the situation in The Gambia, not much was available as this 
was a recent event and information such as reports and articles, regarding challenges faced by 
ECOWAS during the Gambian crisis were scarce.  
The research regarding The Gambia predates the 2016 ECOWAS intervention. This is for the purpose 
of providing a clear insight of events preceding the intervention, such as political and social 
developments that occurred under earlier political regimes, thus research regarding The Gambia 
ranged from studies conducted about the post-colonial period to the change in political regimes in 
2017.    
Concerning conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, research was limited to ECOWAS interventions 
from 1989 to 2002, as both conflicts took place during this time frame. 
1.6 Arrangement of chapters 
This thesis provides an assessment of sub regional peacekeeping in West Africa by ECOWAS and is 
organized into five chapters. After reviewing the research design in Chapter One, such as the 
theoretical framework and research methodology, Chapter two gives an overview of the OAU and 
the collective security mechanisms of ECOWAS. Chapter three investigates the ECOWAS 
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Chapter four consists of an in-depth analysis of the 
Gambian political history, as well as the ECOWAS intervention. In Chapter Five, there is a 
comparative assessment of all three ECOWAS interventions and a summary of the main research 
findings and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. An overview of the Organization of African Unity and the evolution of ECOWAS  
2.1 Introduction 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963, was founded on many historical and 
political events, of which the late 19th century Pan-Africanist movement was a major one. The OAU 
made efforts to identify and address socio-economic developmental issues which overwhelmed the 
continent after the attainment of independence. The main objectives of the OAU Charter were to 
eradicate of any forms of colonialism, defend their sovereignty, promote unity among African States 
and encourage international cooperation. The African Union (AU) succeeded the OAU with a vision 
more geared towards Africa’s development and integration into the global arena.  
Unlike the AU, which plays a prominent role on a continental level, the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), focuses its efforts within West Africa.  
ECOWAS is one of the most important sub-regional organization in West African. Initially formed 
in 1975 with fifteen-member states, ECOWAS sort to develop and promote a more integrated 
economic market. However, civil wars within and between some member states not only threatened 
the peace and security of the region but also hindered ECOWAS’ economic development goals, 
therefore a conflict management function was added to ECOWAS’ objectives.  
The introduction of the conflict management objective brought about the adoptions of three major 
protocols directly relating to peace and security in West Africa. These protocols enabled ECOWAS 
to intervene in conflicts involving member states and subsequently become a highly respected and 
recognized regional organization. 
This chapter seeks to examine the history behind the formation of the OAU and the role of the AU. 
Furthermore, the chapter highlights the evolution of ECOWAS and discusses the protocols and 
structure of its peace and security framework.  
2.2 Organization of African Unity 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU), Africa’s first effort at continental integration, was formed 
on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, by the signing of the OAU charter by representatives from 32 
governments. An additional 21 states have joined throughout the years, with South Africa becoming 
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the 53rd member in 1994 (Iqbal, 1973). This was Africa’s first attempt to address and resolve the 
common challenges in terms of economic development, political freedom and regional security. A 
summit, held in Sirte, Algiers on September 9th, 1999, addressed these issues. The summit theme was 
“Strengthening OAU capacity to enable it to meet the challenges of the new millennium” (Heyns and 
Stefiszyn, 2006, 285).  
The African Union (AU) was created in succession to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
which was need of renewing. The African Union Treaty was adopted on 11 July 2000 in Lomé, Togo. 
This marked the significant progress in terms of African multilateralism in decades. In 2002, the 
Durban Summit launched and convened the first Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union. 
This treaty brought about the ending of the Organization of African Unity within a year, which was 
later replaced by the African Union (Abdulqawi and Fatsah, 2012, 20). 
Accompanying the rise of independent African States from colonial rule were two significant 
developments. Firstly, was the automatic entry of these new States to UN membership. The second 
development was the establishment of a continental organization, which was opened to all 
independent sovereign African States with the aim of perusing the common objectives within these 
independent sovereign African States. This organizations also looked forward to promoting current 
and future unity amongst all the African States, defense of their independence and rule, regulations 
regarding the respect of one’s territory and most important, the eradication of all forms of colonialism 
in Africa.   
The AU’s primary objective is the collective security of all member States and is a vital aspect of 
international cooperation. The AU security council held in high regard, even though all member states 
are entitled to have their own security systems.  
2.2.1 History and Norms  
In order to understand how this regional organization worked, it is first vital to know how it came 
about and based on what principles it functions. The making of Africa was inspired by a pan-African 
doctrine which advocated unity. Establishment of regional and sub-regional groups initiated in 1963 
and reformed into more integrated structures in 1993, all played a role in the making of the Africa we 
know today.   
“The long, long night is over! Colonial and subject peoples of the world – unite!” (Nkrumah, 
1961)  
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This, like a banner snapping in the breeze, did Kwame Nkrumah, future President of the Gold Cost, 
now Ghana, address the oppressed men and women of all continents in 1947.  
The ideology known as pan Africanism came about as a result of slave trade and racial discrimination 
and was brought about in the 19th century. Pan Africanism was a means by which the Black Diaspora 
could unite and seek ways to heal their injured pride and at the same time glorify their motherland 
Africa. This ideology came about in the 1950’s and empowered the African continent.   
Pan-Africanism, according to Hubert Kampang, can be defined as “the ideology of democracy and 
human rights in an African federal framework ... (with the purpose of becoming a) ...  government of 
Africans by Africans, which respects racial and religious minorities who wish to live in Africa with 
the black majority” (Kampang, 1993). 
Therefore, pan-Africanism is not only a political movement but a cultural movement as well, with a 
purpose to unify and create harmony amongst the citizens of African (Chacha, 2003). The movement 
had many key leaders, some of which were Edward Wilmot Blyden, Antenor Firmin, Henry Sylvester 
Williams and Benito Sylvain from the Caribbean, Marcus Garvey from Jamaica and of course, the 
one and only Kwame Nkrumah, also known as the Black Moses from Ghana. 
Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere are two of the most well-known ideologists who defined the 
foundations of African unity. Nyerere’s beliefs were centered around the fact that Africans already 
had means through which they could unite, these means being their history and ongoing difficulties. 
He spoke of an already existing spirit of “African- ness”. Nkrumah shared Nyerere’s beliefs in the 
importance of maintain a stable political and economic environment on the African continent in order 
to ensure the development of a profitable United State of Africa (Chacha, 2003).  There were of 
course underline differences in the ideologies of both men which led to the emergence of two African 
Unity blocks, but despite this, their shared desire for a united Africa led to the establishment of the 
OAU.  
Kwame Nkrumah devoted much effort into the liberation of Ghana, the former British colony of the 
Gold Coast and the first of the European colonies in Africa to gain independence with majority rule. 
He fought and gained Ghana her independence, as well as worked towards the liberation of the 
African continent and finally was able to realize his dream of creating a unified and independent 
Africa in 1961 (Obadare, 2000).  
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In Kwame Nkrumah’s ‘I Speak of Freedom’ speech, he said “Divided we are weak; united, Africa 
could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world.... I believe strongly and sincerely that 
with the deep-rooted wisdom and dignity, the innate respect for human lives, the intense humanity 
that is our heritage, the African race, united under one federal government, will emerge not as just 
another world bloc to flaunt its wealth and strength, but as a Great Power whose greatness is 
indestructible because it is built not on fear, envy and suspicion, nor won at the expense of others, but 
founded on hope, trust, friendship and directed to the good of all mankind.” (Nkrumah, 1961). 
Kwame Nkrumah’s beliefs in equality among all Member States, his desire for the “African 
Congress” to implement policies of the union and defend the continent as well as “collective self-
reliance” within the union for defense, his respect for human rights, civil and political freedoms, 
importance of balanced development and social justice was his reason for advocating for the creation 
of the United States of Africa the 1990’s (Abdulqawi and Fatsah, 2012, 22-23). 
During the summit held in Algier in 1999, the Sirte Declaration was adopted and included important 
matters such as the effective ways of addressing the new social, political and economic realities in 
Africa, eliminating the occurrence of conflicts, harnessing human and natural resources to improve 
the living conditions of citizens of the continent, establishing a continental organization for the 
purpose of meeting the addressing peoples wants and desires (OAU, 1999). 
For these aims to be achieved, the summit sort to establish an African Union, which would be more 
than just one entity and would be in line with the objectives of the Charter of the Continental 
Organization and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community 
(Ciampi, 2011).  
The objectives of the AU as compared to the OAU, were more comprehensive. The new structure 
was geared towards focusing more on the issues being faced on the continent during that period. 
Many more initiatives that promoted the continuous building of African unity were suggested, these 
included the signing of the charter of the Organization of the African Unity, establishing the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the formation of The New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) (OAU Charter, 1963). In addition, some of the aims of the AU were to 
promote the unity and solidarity amongst African States, to defend and promote sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, to encourage and promote international cooperation, to promote democratic 
principles and institutions and good governance, to promote the integration of African economies as 
well as to create sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels (AU, 2002).  
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In as much these aims are a crucial part of the development of the African community, it is also 
important that the member States play an active role in the design and implementation of the African 
Union goals. This will help create a sense of responsibility and inclusivity and in effect help member 
States to sort out and resolve issues concerning the functioning of the organization as well as 
implementation of the decision-making process of the organizations aims. 
In many African countries, politics since the 1960’s have been regarded as a quasi-military mode, 
meaning there was a presence of armed group that were similar to the military. This partially imitated 
the influence of colonial rule. Indeed, several wars of Africa’s current generation are either 
completely related to or are genuine prolongations of struggles that occurred during independence. 
The form of the contest in most African countries changed after 1990, but the fundamentally violent 
nature of the struggle for supreme power did not (Ellis, 2003, 29-43). Following the trend of wars in 
Africa for the last five decades, the characteristics have shifted from the wars of independence to 
more of an armed conflict mostly distinguished by the high levels of harm caused amongst the 
population. Unfortunately, such conflict shows a high tendency to grow rather than subside (UN, 
1998). 
Upon attaining independence, African States, on the basis of respect and sacredness of boundaries, 
they entered into a strict non-interference agreement. These principles were lived by up until the 
1990’s when many intra-states conflicts started to arise causing economic and security issues. Many 
African states began to question the principle of non-interference especially during the conflicts in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone (Olukoshi, 2004).  Subsequently, the progress from mobilized types of 
governmental issues into war, ordinary of such a significant number of nations in Africa, was because 
of contemporary emergencies, including the collapse of a few states, narrow-minded political 
initiative, the results of rushed and impractical projects of structural adjustment and privatization, and 
now and again implemented democratization (Ellis, 2003).  
Politics on the African continent has turned into a flat-out challenge for power, inside which all acts 
of protests and foul play are passable, driving for instance to intermittent, huge scale slaughters. 
Election time in Africa brings with it tension to both the opposing political parties and the electorate 
however sadly, the most defenseless casualties of the fight for political power have consistently been 
the voters. In order to gain victory, most governing political parties have found ways to influence 
their control of both the peoples vote and the state security apparatus, which further boosts their 
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advantage. The legislation that oversees and ensures the free and fair electoral processes has not been 
very useful either as it has similarly been manipulated (Duodu, 2010). 
Unfortunately, during this period assistance from the OAU was not received because of limitations 
by the provisions of its Charter and the principles governing inter-African relations, “Non-
interference in the affairs of States” and “Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every 
State and for its inalienable right to independent existence” (OAU Charter, 1963:3). The inviolable 
principle of sovereignty and the non-interference in the internal affairs of other States were finally 
viewed as having hampered the effective involvement of the OAU and African leaders in conflict 
management and prevention on the continent. 
In an attempt to put a stop to the wait-and-see philosophy, the establishment of the Union and the 
Constitutive Act of the AU, which replaced the Organization of the OAU, made sure to provide as 
one of the basic principles of the new Pan-African intergovernmental Organization under Article 4(h): 
“The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU, 
2000, article 4h). 
“Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, to this end 
decide to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration, the composition of 
which and conditions of service shall be defined by a separate protocol to be approved by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Said Protocol shall be regarded as forming an integral 
part of the present Charter” (OAU Charter, 1963:19). 
States Parties have committed themselves to observe, respect, promote and fulfil both categories of 
rights. Articles 2-14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights highlights the individual civil and 
political rights, while Articles 15-18 ensures the economic, social and cultural rights (OAU, 1986). 
However, not borrowed from the Declaration is the fact that many of the civil and political rights 
carry limitations otherwise known as claw-back clauses i.e. clauses that allow suspension or violation 
of enunciated rights based on domestic legislation. “The Charter has been criticized for its extensive 
deployment of claw back clauses - phrases which could effectively remove (or at a minimum severely 
curtail) the rights ostensibly guaranteed” (BBC, 2008). Human rights groups have also argued that 
this is a serious problem in Africa as many states still have laws and regulations that directly violate 
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human rights. For example, “some states prohibit the formation of certain types of associations merely 
at the whim of the registering officer” (Mapuva, 2016).  
In addition to this, after the OAU had achieved its objectives of ridding the continent of colonialism 
and apartheid, promoting unity and increasing the level of cooperation for mutual development within 
the continent as well as protecting the sovereignty of the new states and improving international 
relations especially with the United Nations (AU, 2018), it was transformed into the AU with the aim 
of creating more allies to accelerate the process of integration between states and  thereby allowing 
for a better position within the global economy. This aim was set during the 1991 Abuja treaty 
establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) (AU, 1991) and since then, formal 
mechanisms for peace and security management operate better within the continent.  
As outlined in the AU protocol of 2002, the AU Peace and Security Council was formed and soon 
after the AU launched its first peacekeeping operation in Burundi. In 2004, the AU deployed its 
second operation in Darfur (AU, 2002).  
The AU is considered as the umbrella body for all African sub regional organizations because it is 
the only African inter-governmental organization with a permanent representation at the UN and this, 
to an extent, has positioned the AU in a way to best represent the various concerns within the 
subregion, including peace and security.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that many Regional Economic Communities (REC’s) already 
existed even before the establishment of the AU and many of these RECs had already progressed in 
the field of peace and security. ECOWAS, being a good example, is one of the REC’s which was 
formed in the 1970’s and had already managed to implement protocols essential to maintaining peace 
and security before the AU’s establishment. Over the years, the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) adapted many essential elements of ECOWAS and these elements later became 
features the APSA was developed.  
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2.3 Introduction to ECOWAS 
 
Figure 1: Map of ECOWAS states 
The concept of war and conflict is consistently evolving particularly regarding the post-cold war era, 
seeing as the classic inter-state idea of conflicts has shifted to the more common occurrence of intra-
state conflict. As a result of this, it is important to first define the concept of conflict and resolution 
that I would be using, as many literatures have different definitions and concepts of conflict. 
ECOWAS defines conflict as “contradictions inherent in power relations and which manifest 
themselves in individual and group interactions with one another and with nature in the pursuit of 
limited resources or opportunities” (Nwagboso, 2008, 10). In as much as conflicts are not always 
violent, the ones that have affected West Africa have commonly been characterized by violence, 
hence, for the purposes of my thesis, I will refer to conflict as a forceful expression of disagreements 
and frustration often come from wants and goals that have been unmet.  
ECOWAS, an organization with an initial mandate of Regional Economic Integration (REC), 
expanded its mandate to include conflict management, as a result of rising levels of conflict in the 
region (ECOWAS, 2018).  Even though ECOWAS was able to establish commendable records in 
peacekeeping with its successful intervention in Liberia, support for the legitimate government in 
Sierra Leone and dispatched fact-finding and election observer missions in Guinea Bissau, it was still 
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generally perceived to have failed in conflict prevention, that is, despites its great achievements in 
Peace keeping, ECOWAS was not able to occupy a central place in regional Peace building.   
West Africa has been dealing with violent conflicts and civil strife for decades, with many of its 
prominent economies greatly destabilized due to extremely violence and prolonged conflicts during 
the periods between the 1980s and the 1990s (UNSC, 2011). Some states that experienced violent 
conflicts during that period include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire (Aning 
and Bah, 2009). With ECOWAS eventually realizing the interrelationship between peace, security 
and economic development, protocols concerning peace and security were adopted. In 1978 the 
Protocol of Non-Aggression (PNA) was adopted (ECOWAS, 1978), which was then followed by the 
Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD) in 1981 and the protocol relating to 
mechanisms for conflict prevention in 1999 (ECOWAS, 1999).  
2.3.1 The Evolution of ECOWAS 
Attempts at political, economic and security integration in West Africa began during the post-colonial 
period which was initiated by Kwame Nkrumah’s desire for a united continental government.  
The period of colonialism played a significant role in the way these states identify themselves today, 
some examples would be the defining of their boundaries, style of government and economic 
infrastructure. Preceding colonialism, the area was known for its kingdoms and empires which existed 
for the span of centuries. Upon attaining independence, the desire of member states of this region to 
integrate their political and economic strengths to promote prosperity became a more realistic goal 
(Asante, 1986), which was of course propelled and challenged by the region’s linguistic, ecological 
and cultural diversity.   
A diversity of factors were responsible for the desire and need of integration in West Africa. First and 
foremost, the creation of an economic community was the best method to attain national and regional 
development which was vital in the 1970’s, as an economic alliance would serve as a good collective 
bargaining platform along with other economic alliances worldwide. Economic integration was 
considered the most suitable way for smaller countries to enhance economic growth through 
association with economies with a larger regional consumer market, ergo sustaining their economic 
stability.  
Despite the high motivation for the formation of a West African economic community, there were 
factors that hindered this process, one of these factors would be that France, the most influential 
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regional actor in West Africa was categorically against integration and consistently discouraged any 
form of co-operation between francophone and anglophone states mostly because it considered itself 
to be the core of African foreign policy. France only encouraged francophone states to preserve post- 
colonial relation (Gambari, 1991).  For example, in 1945, first attempts of integration occurred when 
the French created a government of the Federation of French West Africa (AOF), including a 
francophone West African Customs Union which utilized a centralized single currency. This was 
known as the CFA franc zone and was supported by France (Julienne, 1967). Anglophones, with the 
support of the British, also put up similar institutions. Funding and other means of support between 
francophone West African states and France, as well as anglophone West African states and Britain, 
were mostly based on common history of functional co-operation dating back to the pre-colonial 
period (Fenwick, 2009). This obvious division between the anglophone and francophone states was 
a hinderance to all attempts of the creation of a free regional trade area. 
Despite the fact that the first attempt of integration too place in 1945, the late president Tubman of 
Liberia is until dated accredited for leading the diplomatic and political for integration and creation 
of a West African economic community. This idea of a free trade zone was brought forth during his 
speech on the 7th of January 1964 and also supported by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (UN-ECA) but was deemed unsuccessful due to the clash between francophone and 
anglophone West African states (Cline-Cole and Robson, 2016).  
Among the anglophone states in West Africa, Nigeria was the major catalyst in the creation of a West 
African economic community. In as much as Nigeria’s leading role was influenced by the Biafran 
civil war in the late 1960’s, which caused its government to develop a stronger interest in region 
security, the oil crisis of 1973 which made Nigeria an oil producer unquestionably drew attention of 
the international community. The newly acquired oil resources only reinforced their ambitions in the 
region causing them to adopt a strategy of ‘oil diplomacy’ within their foreign policy. As Nigeria 
assumed the leadership role in the formation of ECOWAS, its rhetoric was always focused toward 
limiting French influence as they were perceived to be rivals. France, since the colonial period has 
been a powerful actor in the West African region as a result of their economic, political and military 
contribution over the years (Gambari, 1991).  
In 1972, the Nigerian head of state General Yakubu Gowon and President Gnassingbe Eyadema of 
Togo collaborated in recruiting support of the regional integration by touring the whole region. 
Almost instantaneously, six francophone states, namely, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, 
26 
Mali and Mauritania came together to create what was known as Communauté Economique de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest (C.E.A.O.) in an attempt to counterbalance Nigerian influence in the region. 
General Gowon went further to form the Nigeria-Togo embryonic West African Economic 
Community (WAEC) with the collaboration of President Eyadema, opening membership to all states 
of the region (Bach, 1983). This led to a rivalry between the two regional economic groups in the 
region, one of which was exclusively for francophone states, whereas the other was a more inclusive 
community.  
In April 1972, Generals Gowon and Eyadema went on to draft a treaty for the formation of a new 
regional integration union in the West African region. The draft treaty was examined and reviewed 
in December 1973, in January 1974 and in January 1975 by interested regional states during meetings 
in Togo, Ghana and Liberia respectively.  Finally, the ECOWAS treaty was signed in Lagos on 28th 
May 1975 by the original fifteen states (ECOWAS, 1975). In 1977 upon attaining independence, 
Cape Verde became the sixteenth member. Following the withdrawal of Mauritania in 2001, there 
are fifteen-member states in ECOWAS as of today. Togo and Niger play a vital role in drawing other 
francophone states into joining.  
The primary objective of the ECOWAS treaty was the creation of a market that focused on liberalized 
trade and the formation of opened barriers for free access and movement of factors of production such 
as goods, services and of course people. The promotion of integration and cooperation between states 
was a vital part in the formation of an economic zone and developing of the continent. The aims of 
the ECOWAS treaty were to empower the people by raising living standards, enhancing economic 
stability and fostering a friendliness amongst the various states in the region (ECOWAS, 1993). 
2.3.2 ECOWAS Peace and Security Framework 
In the late 1970’s, acts of aggression continued to rise in West Africa. This led to the rational that 
economic integration and security were mutually exclusive. The treaty of Lagos initially did not have 
any provisions for ensuring security in the region, therefore, in April 1978, ECOWAS established the 
first document on defense corporation, the Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA). The protocol insisted 
that all its signatories refrain from committing or encouraging any acts aggression that might lead to 
intrastate conflicts (ECOWAS, 1978). However, this protocol did not really address the main issue 
of third-party intervention, thus a second security related document was established, the Protocol on 
Mutual Assistance in Defense (PMAD). This protocol was signed in 1981 during a Summit in Sierra 
Leone but only came into force in 1986. Mutual assistance according to the protocol implied that in 
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the case of a conflict, ECOWAS would be prepared and willing to offer assistance in the form of a 
fully armed and combat ready military unit comprising of armies from the ECOWAS member states 
(ECOWAS, 1981). Intervention in a conflict would need to be requested in a form of a written request 
for assistance from the Head of State of that member state and based upon this request, a decision 
will be made. Unfortunately, this protocol only focused on external threats, thus there were no 
provisioned made for internal conflicts. Further inadequacies of the PMAD were exposed during the 
civil war in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1980’s.  
Upon the signing of the revised ECOWAS treaty in July 1993, further commitments were made 
regarding ensuring swift and adequate prevention and resolution of both intra and inter-state conflicts 
(ECOWAS, 1993). Based on this, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security was adopted on 31st October 1998 and came 
into force on 10th December 1999 in Lomé, Togo (ECOWAS, 1999). It was also referred to as the 
Mechanism. The Mechanism greatly improved the conflict prevention and resolution strategies of 
ECOWAS and also effectively bridged the gap between the PNA and the PMAD. Last but not the 
least, The Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) was also considered 
to be among the earlier initiatives by ECOWAS. 
ECOWAS’ key institutions are Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of 
Ministers, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security, 
the Community Court of Justice, the ECOWAS Community Parliament, the Executive Secretariat 
and six Specialized Technical Commissions (Bakhoum, 2010).  
These institutions help ECOWAS set targets and achieve its goals within its Peace and Security 
Structures of which the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) is part. The Office of the 
Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) oversees issues regarding peace and 
security and is the main structure upon which issues of peace and security are built. Other structures 
include the Commission’s Office for Humanitarian Affairs, the Inter-Governmental Action Group 
against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA) and WACSOF. 
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Within the MSC are three main structures, namely the Council of Elders, the ECOWAS Standby 
Forces (ESF) and the Defense and Security Commission (DSC). A clearer outline of the MSC 
structure can be found in the table below. 
Figure 2: Main organs within ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council. 
 
The most powerful institutional decision-making body in matters relating to regional peace and 
security (under the mechanism) is the Mediation and Security Council. The MSC has been given a 
mandate to make decisions necessary for the mechanism such as mediation interventions or 
peacekeeping missions on behalf of the Authority of Heads of State and Government (Abass, 2000, 
215).  
The ECOWAS Standby Forces (ESF) was established for the purpose of Peace Support Operations 
(PSO) and consists of a military police and civilian components assembled from ECOWAS member 
states (ECOWAS, 1999).  
The Defense and Security Commission on the other hand is a asses technical and administrative issues 
as well as logistical requirements for the ESF. The DSC is made up of the Committee of Chiefs of 
Defense Staff which is responsible for the military aspect of the ESF and the Committee of Chiefs of 
Security Service which advises on matters regarding civilians and polices. 
The Council of Elders was created for the purpose of preventative diplomacy and is made up of 
renowned and respected individuals who have been chosen to play the role of mediators, facilitators 
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and conciliators on behalf of ECOWAS (Ismail 2008, 25). Usually, in certain conflicts, exploratory 
and/or preliminary missions are carried out by the Council of Elders.  
Following ECOWAS’ decision to branch into conflict resolution and prevention, a great deal of work 
regarding the promotion of peace and security in the area was accomplished through the mandates 
provided under the earlier protocols but nevertheless, there were issues relating to aspects of the 1999 
Mechanism that involved preventive measure to conflicts. Based on this, as well as the desire for a 
better and longer lasting solution to peace and security in the region, the ECOWAS Conflict 
Prevention Framework (ECPF) was adopted in 2008 (ECOWAS, 2008, para. 27) The overall idea of 
the ECPF was not necessarily to prevent conflicts but rather to ensure that conflict do not escalate 
into violent outbreaks, thus the objects of the ECPF were to diffuse of tension and prevent conflict 
outbreak in the region, as well as the prevention of conflict escalation and relapse. Therefore, it would 
be safe to say that ECPF provides a better alternative to sustaining regional peace and security.  
In order for the ECPF to achieve regional peace and security, it has targeted some issue areas which 
when addressed, will help the ECPF attain its goals. These issue areas include Human Rights and the 
Rule of Law, Peace and Security, Standby Force, Preventive Diplomacy, Early Warning, Natural 
Resources and Governance, Democracy and Political Governance, Women, Media, Cross-Border 
initiative, Youth Empowerment, Peace Education and Humanitarian Assistance (ECOWAS, 2008, 
para. 42) These are all essential matters that continue contributing to political instability and conflicts 
in the region. The ECPF is one of the legal frameworks that serves as a practical guide on conflict 
management.  
Unlike any other document, the ECPF not only covers a wide area of issues but also brings together 
all existing ECOWAS initiatives, which allows for an overall easier implementation. The challenges 
on the other hand are the raising of ample financial resources to fund the implementation of the 
project, as they can be carried out throughout the subregion for a long period of time. 
The Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System was developed an became a crucial tool of 
the ECPF and is used to help ECOWAS predict possible conflicts and facilitate immediate 
interventions. Their role is to monitor peace and security in the subregion as well as humanitarian, 
political and social events. Their activities include submitting reports and recommendations based on 
collected and analyzed data. The Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) acts as the center of 
ECOWAS early warning system. The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network 
(ECOWARN) was revived to help achieve this objective. 
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ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established during 1990 to intervene in the 
civil war in Liberia. It was seen fit to be merged into the new conflict management framework as it 
was an indispensable apparatus for the upkeep of harmony in the district. ECOMOG was set up by 
member states as a reaction to security issues and comprises for the most part of troops from the 
military of ECOWAS member states. This military power comprises of land, ocean and air 
components, with a hierarchical command structure.  The deputy force commanders are below the 
force commander and under them are the troops. The chief of staff and his central planning staff are 
responsible for resolving problems and coordinating activities. Before any missions are assigned, 
various factors are taken into consideration. These factors include, the affinity, strength and 
equipment of each contingent commanders’ troops, as well as the instructions given by their home 
government. 
ECOMOG was been adopted for the purpose of regional intervention during political crises within 
the framework provided under the ECOWAS regional mechanism for conflict resolution.  During the 
1990s, ECOMOG interventions became more popular starting from the need to secure peace in 
Liberia. Peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement are two possible forms ECOMOG can take and it is 
able to switch quickly from one form to another depending on the level of the conflict at hand. In 
addition to this, ECOMOG also monitors ceasefire agreements, and enforce them if or when the 
conflict parties who signed the ceasefire do not adhere to the terms of the agreement, but nevertheless, 
all this is built on Article 33 (1), chapter VI of the UN Charter which encourages countries to first 
seek solutions to conflicts and/or disagreements through mediation, negotiations, arbitration and other 
peacebuilding interventions. 
Below is a table outlining the Peace and security architecture of ECOWAS. Information for the 
compilation of this table was taken from the ECOWAS Protocol of 1999 Relating to the Mechanism. 
ECOWAS   
The Commissioner or Directorate  The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and 
Security (PAPS) or Directorate for PAPS 
The Council of prominent individuals for 
purpose of mediation  
The Council of Elders  
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The Decision-making body on peace and 
security  
The Mediation and Security Council  
Early Warning The ECOWAS Early Warning System, which 
includes the Directorate, Observation and 
Monitoring Centre and the Observation and 
Monitoring Zones (ECOWARN) 
Funding Mechanism The Peace Fund 
Parliamentary oversight The ECOWAS Community Parliament  
Peace support (Standby Force) ECOMOG (ESF) 
Technical Committee Defense and Security Commission  
 Figure 3: ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture 
 
With the deviation in the initial goals of economic cooperation, ECOWAS Authority of Heads of 
State and Government, in an attempt to show that it still remained true to the cause, adopted a 
resolution in June 2007 referred to as Vision 2020. “The ECOWAS Vision 2020 is aimed at setting a 
clear direction and goal to significantly raise the standard of living of the people through conscious 
and inclusive programs that will guarantee a bright future for West Africa” (ECOWAS Vision 2020, 
para. 3). This was regarded as a blueprint to the region’s development and the President of the 
ECOWAS Commission was directed to assemble and inform citizens of the region about the vision 
in order to achieve it by 2020.   
2.4 Conclusion 
The OAU, which was founded on the ideological Pan-Africanism movement and set off as an 
organization seeking to completely eradicate all forms of colonialism, eventually paved the way for 
the formation of the AU, whose objectives were more comprehensive as compared to the OAU. The 
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work of the AU played a major role in enabling Africans to take on a larger responsibility in ensuring 
proper conflict management on the continent.  
Despite ECOWAS’ initial objectives of economic development, it successfully managed to reevaluate 
and implement new aims that were necessary and vital during that time. This in my opinion can be 
classified as a key achievement. As ECOWAS further developed their role in ensuring regional 
security, the PNA was adopted but quickly replaced by the PMAD when it was found to be lacking. 
Through the additional implementation of the Mechanism, conflict prevention and resolution 
strategies of ECOWAS were greatly improved. This protocol also effectively bridged the gap between 
the PNA and the PMAD. In addition, the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance helped address major constitutional issues.  
The cooperation between ECOWAS, the AU and the UN have consisted mainly of peacekeeping but 
has the relationship between these organizations been structured in a way that allows each body to 
maximize their comparative advantage and at the same time achieve reciprocity? These organizations 
might work well together but the nature of the relationship between the AU and ECOWAS is still 
unclear. The usefulness of the AU’s role as the ‘middle man’ has been questioned throughout the 
years despite it being considered the umbrella body for all African REC’s. One would therefore 
expect that the AU would be in the best position to equally represent the concerns of the various 
regions, but this is not so, as the AU not only lacks the necessary resources to utilize its peace and 
security mechanisms and policies, but also, requires better harmonization with ECOWAS. Even with 
the AU and ECOWAS having an effective working relationship with the UN, the communication 
between the AU and ECOWAS does not always appear to be consistent and coordinated, creating the 
impression that the AU does not position itself in a way to ensure full appreciation and understanding 
of the major issues of the West African region.  
Instead of completely relegating the AU, more effort should be made by the AU to understand and 
confidently speak out on the major issues being faced by the various regions in Africa. Also, it would 
be more efficient to have several African inter-governmental organizations with the authority to 
represent Africa at the UN. This will not only take the pressure off the AU, but it will also help to 
clarify areas of expertise and collaboration. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
3.1 Introduction 
Interventions in conflicts by a third party is not a new practice. External military interventions through 
peacekeeping have become a common way by which the reoccurrence of violent conflicts are 
avoided. The third party usually consists of a state or states army (military troops) with military 
training, ammunition and a clear mandate. The use of violence is of course an anticipated fact, even 
if not always adhered to.  
The PNA and the PMAD were essentially the two main protocols through which ECOWAS was 
enabled to intervene in conflicts involving member states.  Subsequently, ECOWAS was obligated 
to intervene in the Liberian conflict in 1989 as a third party. This was achieved through ECOMOG, 
a military force formed by and consisting of troops from ECOWAS Member States.  The purpose of 
the involvement of ECOMOG was to stop the NPFL from overthrowing the president, Samuel Doe. 
Having entered Liberia in 1989, ECOMOG only managed to restore peace in 1998, after which 
ECOMOG left.  
Sierra Leone faced similar events to that of Liberia, with the RUF committing terrible atrocities under 
the command of Foday Sankoh and only in 1998 was a cease-fire reacted between Sierra Leone and 
the RUF, followed by a peace pact. This chapter will look into the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
conflicts, while examining the role ECOWAS planed in resolving them.  
3.2 The Liberian civil war  
On the 24th of December 1989, Liberia’s first civil war begun. The conflict escalated extremely 
rapidly leaving thousand’s dead and many more fleeing across the border. (Refer to Figure 1 for the 
map of ECOWAS states)  
Even before Liberia was declared an independent state in July 1847, Liberian politics and economy 
were dominated by Liberian- American settlers. This movement of settlers was brought about by the 
establishment of the American Colonization Society (ASC) in 1816, which attempted to resettle 
slaves who had been freed. The first ship of freed black American slaves was sent to West Africa in 
December 1821 (Guannu, 1982). The first settlers were given a strip of land called Cape Mesurado, 
currently known as Monrovia on which they continued expanding their colonies for the next fifteen 
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years. In 1838, these colonies created the Commonwealth of Liberia and later were referred to as the 
Americo-Liberians (Liberianforum.com, n.d.). The Americo-Liberians did not identify with the 
indigenous people as many of them were mixed race including American and European ancestry. The 
Americo-Liberians held onto power and over the years, attempted to force the indigenous people to 
their rule as they were in control of both politics and the economy and were in the position to create 
separate laws for local people and colonies (Mgbeoji, 2003). This attitude only led to a stronger 
resentment between the two groups. Finally, with the help of a group of non-commissioned army 
offices Master Sergeant Samuel Doe overthrew the True Whig Party and ousted their Americano-
Liberian President William Tolbert on the 12th of April 1980, who had started his own term as 
President in 1972(Aboagye, 1999). This ended the 133-year Americano-Liberian rule. 
Despite the fact that the new Head of State, Sergeant Samuel Doe, was a member of the indigenous 
people and was well aware of their grievances, his administration did not strive to resolve the 
underlining problems but in contrast worsened the current issues with his autocratic regime. Terrible 
acts of human right violations were committed, misuse of state resources, wrongful imprisonment 
and torture, alongside executions both public and secret. Also, Doe’s allies, associates and fellow 
ethnic members were fond of destruction of property, intimidation, rape and many other acts 
(Adebajo, 2002) 
In 1984, a new constitution was adopted. Doe ordered an election, announced his candidacy and 
officially became President of Liberia on 15th October 1985 on the ticket of the National Democratic 
Party of Liberia (NDFL), formally sworn in on 6th January 1986 with a six-year mandate. Events 
leading to elections were overcome by riggings, were Doe’s ballots were taken and counted by his 
own staff, illegal arrests and murders of political opponents and threats. Foreign observers declared 
the elections fraudulent (Gifford, 1993). 
This displeased many people, including General Thomas Quiwonkpa, then, a commander of the 
Liberian Armed forces, and also the leader of the 1980 coup along with Doe. General Quiwonkpa 
orchestrated a coup d’état on 12th November 1985 to seize power from Doe but failed and was 
executed. Unfortunately, this event caused Doe’s administration to become even more oppressive. 
Newspapers were closed down, while mass murders of members of General Quiwonkpa’s ethnic 
community, Gio, were committed (Outram, 1999). This inevitably commenced a divide between 
ethnic groups that had lived in relative harmony throughout the years.  
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During this period of rigged elections and failed coup attempts, Charles Taylor and his National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an attack on 24th December 1989. Since Doe’s soldiers 
were mostly from the Krahn ethnic group and the NPFL consisted of mostly Gio and Mano ethnic 
groups (Aboagye, 1999), western media depicted this civil war as one of ethnic disparity calling it 
‘tribalism’, which in fact it was not (Moran, 2006, 16-17). Despite all efforts from the Armed Forces 
of Liberia (AFL), the NPFL managed to take control of a majority of Liberia’s territory by May 1990. 
In September 1990, Doe was brutally assassinated.   
The wide state of panic, murder and destruction resulted in massive destabilization within Liberia and 
also the surrounding states (Aboagye, 1999), but even with these tragic turns of events, the 
international community did not find merit or reason to intervene (Ero, 1995).  
3.2.1 The ECOWAS Intervention in the Liberian Conflict 
In May 1990, the Liberian Council of Churches, alongside Muslim leaders and high-ranking 
Liberian’s requested for but were denied any form of intervention by the United Nations, referencing 
the non-interference in the internal affairs of member states clause (Aboagye, 1999). Petitions in 
regard to intervention were also made by ECOWAS but also denied. In line with this, the former 
president of Nigeria, Ibrahim Badangida, during the 13th Session of the Authority of Heads of State 
and Government of ECOWAS, which was arranged in Banjul, Gambia, from 28-30th of May 1990, 
proposed setting up a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). This committee would be comprised 
of four members, who’s duty would be to intervene during inter or intra state conflicts with a 
mediatory role. Peace talks were scheduled for July 1990 between President Doe’s government and 
the NPFL. The NPFL rejected the proposal of a ceasefire and called it an invasion force. Nevertheless, 
the summit of the Heads of State of the SMC convened for the first time on the 6th and 7th of August, 
in Gambia, to discuss various options for resolution. At this meeting, the ECOWAS Standing 
Mediation Committee had the opportunity to establish an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) aimed at putting an end to the tragic civil war in Liberia by restoring order in the country 
and creating an environment suitable for holding an election (Adibe, 1997). This was the first of three 
basic provisions ECOWAS sought to put in place for the purpose of destabilizing the state. 
Deportation and resettling refugees was the second provision, and the third was a political provision 
put in place to assure that conferences are held for the formation of a broad-based government. The 
ECOWAS peace plan was approved at another meeting during the same month. The Decision 
A/DEC.1/8/90, article 1, of the ECOWAS Peace plan involved, among other things, an appeal for an 
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instant ceasefire of all military action with the help of ECOMOG, a lay down and transfer of arms to 
ECOMOG, formation of an interim government for the administration of the country, Free and fair 
elections conducted and observed by ECOWAS for the purpose of a democratically elected 
government, abstinence of all actives that could prejudice the formation of an interim government or 
holding of free and fair elections, full cooperation with the SMC (ECOWAS, 1990). 
The recommendations made during the ECOWAS Peace Plan created a divide between he 
Anglophone and the Francophone member states. All the Francophone states, except Guinea, 
followed the lead of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, who opposed the intervention. On 25th August 
1990, the recommendations of military intervention were approved based on humanitarian grounds 
and ECOMOG deployed troops to Liberia which initially consisted of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, 
Guinea, The Gambia, and Sierra Leone. Later, Ivory Coast, Benin, Mali and Niger also sent troops 
despite Togo and Mali refusing to do so.   
Upon the arrival of ECOMOG troops at the Freeport in Liberia, Charles Taylor’s NPFL soldiers 
attack them. However, ECOMOG forces were able to prevail and eventually secured the Freeport. 
By the end of November 1990, ECOMOG established an Interim Government of National Unity with 
Amos Sawyer as the head. ECOMOG also managed to secure Monrovia from NPFL forces and 
successfully evacuate over 30,000 refugees.  
Despite its progress, ECOMOG faced a fair share of challenges. Due to the hurried nature of 
deployment of troops, training of troops before deployment was not conducted (Aboagye, 1999). In 
addition to this, there was an inadequate access to material to aid with the familiarization of the 
geography of Liberia (Howe, 1996). Last but not the least, the availability of logistics was insufficient, 
forcing troops to relay of personal resources or even end up occasionally unarmed. There was a high 
dependence on Nigeria for financial and logistical support as they had contributed the largest number 
of troops, fire weapons and funds for the intervention (Brown, 1999).  
Upon its deployment, ECOMOG remained the only source of security in Liberia for the next seven 
years. The number of troops exceeded 10,000 from various countries within West Africa (Adeyemi, 
1997). Some countries that could not afford to deploy soldiers, offered medical assistance and also 
made financial contributions. Throughout the period in which ECOMOG upheld stability in Liberia, 
its role and mission did not necessarily remain the same. In the earlier stages, they maintained a 
position of mostly peacekeeping activities. About several years into their deployment, they assumed 
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a position of self-defense as the attacks of rebel groups increased due to the belief that ECOMOG 
was part of the conflict.  
Regardless of the prolonged war, changing responsibilities and the wavering attitudes of ECOWAS 
member states, ECOMOG not only handled the difficult process of disarmament, protection of 
observers from the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNIL) and securing a safe and 
transparent democratic presidential election but they also facilitated thirteen peace agreements. The 
following are the ECOWAS peace agreements in chronological order: 
a. The Bamako Accord of 27th-28th November 1990 
b. The Lomé summit of the ECOWAS standing Mediation Committee of 12th-13th February 1991 
c. All - Liberia Conference of 15th March 1991 
d. Consultative Meeting of Heads of State in Yamoussoukro- Yamoussoukro I of 29th-30th June 1991 
e. The 14th summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 4th-6th July 1991 
f. First Yamoussoukro Summit of the Committee of Five -Yamoussoukro II, 29th July 1991 
g. Second meeting of the Committee of Five, Yamoussoukro III, 16th-17th September 1991 
h. Third meeting of the Committee of Five, Yamoussoukro IV, 29th-30th October 1991 
i. Informal Consultative Group Meeting, Geneva Switzerland, 6th-7th April 1992 
j. 15th Summit of ECOWAS, 27th-29th July 1992 
k. The Cotonou Agreement, 25th-26th July 1993 
l. The Akosombo Agreement, Ghana, 21st December 1994 
m. Abuja Accord, Nigeria, 20th August 1995 
These peace agreements took place within a time frame of six years and if not for the dedication of 
the ECOWAS members, these agreements would have had no avail. This type of cooperation 
demonstrated a very unified block.  
In July 1997, ECOMOG successfully established a final cease-fire and assisted in presidential 
elections of which Charles Taylor became president. After these events, ECOMOG troops returned 
home.   
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3.3 Political History of Sierra Leone  
Sierra Leone is a West African country bordering with the Atlantic Ocean, Liberia and Guinea. As of 
2016, the country’s population was at 7.396 million covering a surface area of 71,740 square 
kilometres. Like most African countries, Sierra Leone has a diversity of ethnic groups, sixteen to be 
precise. Each speak their own language and have their individual customs. Some of these ethnic 
groups include Temne and Mendes which are the largest in number and also the most influential. 
Other ethnic groups include Mandingos, Sherbros, Limba, Kono and Krio people who are 
descendants of freed West Indian and African American slaves who settled in Free town, Sierra 
Leones capital, in the 18th century. Although it’s a minority, the Krio language, an English based 
Creole, is the most widely spoken language after English, which is the official language of the country 
(Harris, 2013). (Refer to Figure 1 for the map of ECOWAS states). 
Upon the abolishment of slavery, many freed slaves were relocated to Sierra Leone, which was 
divided into a colony and a protectorate in 1924 by the UK government and a different political 
system was constitutionally defined for each section. As in many other African countries, Sierra 
Leone also experienced resentment between Creole elites of the colony and African elites of the 
protectorate. The Creoles rejected political equality with the local Africans, adhering to separatism in 
their political views. The protectorate Africans in return resented them for regarding themselves as 
superior (Kandeh, 1992). This continued throughout the nineteenth century up until Sierra Leone 
gained its independence.  
In 1947, a proposal was made by the leaders of the protectorate for the creation of a single political 
system for both the colony and protectorate, the proposal was rejected. 
Under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai in 1951, the educated protectorate leaders from different 
ethnic groups came together with the chiefs of the protectorate to form the Sierra Leone People’s 
Party (SLPP). In 1953 a new constitution was adopted allowing for parliamentary elections of 30 
seats in legislative council.  
The SLPP won the elections and Sir Milton Margai was appointed the first Prime Minister. He further 
managed to convince several opposition leaders to join his party. However, Siaka Stevens and some 
other critics of the SLPP formed their own party, the All People’s Congress Party (APC) which 
became the SLPP’s main opposition party.  
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In April 1960, negotiations for independence, led by Sir Milton Margai, were held in London and 
Sierra Leone attained its independence on April 27th, 1961. The election was won by Milton Margai 
in 1962 and he remained the Prime Minister until he died in 1964 (Harris, 2013).  
Upon the death of Sir Milton Margai, Albert Margai his half-brother, replaced him as the leader of 
the SLPP and Prime Minister of the country.  During Albert Margai’s term in power, he adhered to 
more of authoritarian actions, as well as made attempts to create a one-party-state. He brought about 
ethnic tensions by appointing members of his ethnicity, which was Mende, in a vastly Creole 
dominated area capital.  In short, his rule was disliked in comparison to his brother (Dramani, 2003).  
In March 1967, elections were held again and Siaka Stevens, from the All Peoples Congress (APC) 
was elected in as Prime Minister. Unfortunately for Stevens, Henry Lightto, the Governor General at 
that time, planned to swear Stevens into office without awaiting response for regional heads and 
chiefs, which in turn angered Brigadier David Lansana, commander of the Sierra Leone Armed 
Forces and a close ally of Albert Margai who forced him to seize Stevens in a bloodless military coup. 
Stevens went into exile in Guinea upon his release (Dramani, 2003). 
A few days after these events, Brigadier David Lansana was removed and the constitution suspended 
by a group of military officers from the Sierra Leone Army led by Brigadier General Andrew Juxon-
Smith. They formed the National Reformation Council (NRC), positioning Brigadier Andrew Juxon-
Smith as its chairman, as well as making him the countries Head of State. On the 18th of April 1968, 
the NRC was overthrown, Stevens returned power and the constitution reinstated by the Anti-
Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM), another group of soldiers from the Sierra Leone 
Army led by Brigadier General John Amadu Bangura. 
From 1970, more coup attempts were made to topple the APC government. In March 1971 one more 
coup took place against the APC government but was stopped with help of Guinean troops, these 
coup attempts forced the party to its best to suppress the opposition while consolidating power. 
Financial scandals by government officials along with further political unrest brought President Siaka 
Stevens to declare Sierra Leone a one-party state (Abdullah, 1998). Even upon promising to resign 
from the presidency after the 1981 elections, Stevens returned to government after the following 
elections in 1981 and hung on to power until 1986 when he finally stepped down and handed over to 
Major General Joseph Momoh. Major General Momoh’s time in power wasn’t very successful, as of 
less than a year, the economic state of Sierra Leone was low, corruption was at its peak, there was a 
wide spread of strikes caused by unpaid workers and finally allegations of rigged elections brought 
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about a coup attempted against his government (Harris, 2013). The economic decline and massive 
unemployment took an immense toll especially on the dissatisfied youth of Sierra Leone, which were 
recruited for military training in Libya.  
Major General Momoh’s government responded to these events by taking actions of an oppressive 
nature such as imposing press restriction and enforcing laws against collecting and storing of goods 
as well as currencies. 
The government of Major General Momoh was put to an end by a coup in April 1992. The coup of 
29th April 1992 suspended constitutional reforms of Major General Momoh and placed Captain 
Valentine Strasser as Head of State of Sierra Leone. The situations of state collapse which created 
the breeding grounds for violent protests led to the led to the formation of the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) which launched an internal war against Sierra Leone in March 1991.Thus apart from 
three failed coup attempts against the Strasser military regime, it also had to deal with the invasion 
and rebellion of the RUF of Sierra Leone from Liberia, led by Corporal Foday Sanko with the support 
of the Liberian leader Charles Taylor attacked Sierra. 
3.3.1 The conflict in Sierra Leone 
The original Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was formed by a group of radical lecturers and 
students of the Fourah Bay College of Freetown in 1982. The RUF of Sierra Leone which was led by 
Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh was a faction of this, who’s aim was to liberate the people from the 
corruption and oppression of the APC government. RUF considered itself to be a people’s movement 
seeking for the to replace Sierra Leone’s patrimonial system with a revolutionary egalitarian system.   
The RUF sought after the mobilization of the disgruntled youth and the socially excluded for the 
formation of a ‘people’s army’ aimed at overthrow the All Peoples’ Congress regime of President 
Joseph Momoh (Zack-Williams, 2012). This movement was initially relayed on the manpower of 
hired Liberian fighters but later took to abducting and training their abductees (Krijn and Richards, 
1988). While most abductees cooperated as a means to save their lives, some found themselves in 
agreeance with the movement.  
The civil war erupted on 23 March 1991, when the RUF fighters entered Eastern Sierra Leone at 
Bamaru from Liberian territory which was controlled by Charles Taylor (Osita, 2006, 32-33). Despite 
the toughness of this group, they were not taken seriously initially. Not by the people, the local or the 
international media.  
41 
The conflict in Sierra Leonean, stared off similar to that of the Liberian civil war, initially with just a 
few hundred fighters, and then multiplied to thousands swiftly. Even with a large army, massive 
human rights violations and bloodshed, the RUF could not gain power until 1997.  
In April 1992, from within the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) some unpaid and 
dissatisfied war-front officers led by Captain Valentine Strasser staged a coup against the Momoh 
government. Momoh was removed from office. The RUF rebels felt they had aided in the 
radicalization of these officers at the war front and expected to share in their victory, but this never 
happened (Krijn and Richards, 1988). Initially, the RUF demanded that Sierra Leone be returned to 
a democratic pluralist system, however this demand changed after the APC was toppled. Captain 
Valentine Strasser and his officers felt that only good leadership could prevail and aid in defeating 
the rebels. This regime was called the National Provisional Revolutionary Council (NPRC) and it 
sought to find a settlement with the rebel forces (Krijn and Richards, 1988). These officers were 
influenced by the way Flight Lieutenant Rawlings brought ‘discipline’ into the Ghanaian society and 
economy. Strasser condemned all acts of corruption and impropriety from the Momoh administration. 
During his time as a leader, he promised to bring back peace, all the while witnessing the growth of 
rebel incursions throughout the country. The NPRC used mainstream rhetoric of anti-corruption and 
personal sacrifice. Strasser was often referred to as ‘the redeemer’.     
By early 1993, the RUF had managed to capture some towns through attacks launched into Sierra 
Leone but as taken down by government troops by December 1993. Nevertheless, RUF activities 
continued to spread further into the country. During this time, two British members of a relief 
organization were captured, and demands were made to the British government, stating that 
conditions for the release of those captured, the British government recognize RUF as a political 
organization and assistance with arms and medical supplies.  
In early February 1995, Sankoh rejected UN and AU appeals for peace negotiations. In place of this, 
he commanded the removal of all foreign troops from the country and stated this to be his precondition 
for negotiations. Unfortunately, continued acts of looting, banditry and indiscriminate killing carried 
on until mid-February. The worsened security within the country called for the need to appeal for 
reinforcement from Guinea, Nigeria and South African and soldiers who had served in the British 
Army. The Sierra Leonean government also invited ECOWAS to be a mediator in negotiations with 
RUF, but negotiations were refused by RUF, who again demanded the exclusion of every single 
remote troop from Sierra Leone as a condition for any chance of further talks. With difficulty 
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arranging negotiations with the RUF, the Strasser regime, in December 1995, announced a course of 
action for the elections in February 1996 but regrettably was overthrown in a nonviolent coup in 
January 1996, elevating Captain Julius Maada Bio, who was the Chief of Defense Staff (Bangura, 
2000).  
Upon finding out about this, the RUF eagerly showed willingness to negotiate with the new 
government. It then requested for a suspension of elections pending a possible peace agreement that 
would permit the participation of RUF in elections in exchange for a temporary ceasefire. The 
Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) in addition to pressure from the international 
community led to the rejection of a ceasefire, leaving the RUF to launch other series of offensives, 
killing many civilians. Sankoh ordered that all citizens captured by the RUF be amputated (to see 
how they will be able vote). Despite the collapse of the ceasefire, elections were held on 26 February 
1996. The SLPP won the race and its pioneer, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, was chosen president. 
Inauguration of the SLPP government took place on February 29th, 1996 (Bangura, 2000).  
3.3.2 ECOWAS Peace Initiatives in the Sierra Leonean Conflict   
The Sierra Leonean conflict, just like the Liberian civil war with the NPFL, started off with just a 
small number of RUF fighters. After six years, rapid increase in RUF supporters and a lot of 
bloodshed, RUF gained control in 1997.  
The Kabbah government soon after entering office took to resolving the civil war by starting 
discussions with the RUF in Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire. The Yamoussoukro discussions in 
November 1996, led to a peace agreement being signed and RUF being granted amnesty. RUF was 
now to be recognized as a political party, soldiers were to surrender their arms and reintegrate into 
civil society. RUF could not agree to issues requiring them to disarm and allow monitoring force. On 
May 25th, 1997, just over a year later, RUF soldiers relaunched attacks and set into motion a coup 
that led to the overthrow of Kabbah’s presidency (Osita, 2006). 
Things only got worse after this. SLPP government fell victim of a violent coup and during this coup 
Major Johnny Paul Koroma was released by the initiators of the coup and he was named Head of 
State with Sankoh as his deputy. Major Johny Paul Koroma went on to establish a new government, 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Due to the common interests of both the regular 
army and the RUF, the AFRC became a joint junta of the junior officers of Sierra Leonean Army. 
The overthrow of President Kabbah troubled the international community greatly, it led to the UN 
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Security Council Resolution 1132 of January 1998 which imposed a ban on the junta, not allowing 
them to move freely. Johnny Koroma’s leadership brought utter ruin to law and order in society as 
well as economy.  
In March of 1997, a bilateral agreement was signed between Sierra Leone and Nigeria. This 
agreement was to provide training for the Sierra Leonean army and the Presidential guard (Osita, 
2006). Nigeria’s intervention was not successful, leaving room for only an outreach of support from 
other ECOWAS members.  
Following requests from President Kabbah and OAU leaders, ECOWAS started putting together 
measures aimed at resolving the coup d’état in Sierra Leone. 
At the initiative of Nigeria’s General Sani Abacha, ECOWAS Chairman at that time, along with 
requests from other Heads of State in the sub-region, the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs met 
in the Republic of Guinea, Conakry, on June 25, 1997, to review and explore ways to achieve a quick 
restoration of the constitutional order within the country. ECOWAS identified three objectives it had 
to pursue; 
• Reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Kabba 
• Return of peace and security  
• Resolution of the issue of refugees and displaced persons 
A Ministerial Committee made up of four Foreign Ministers, i.e. from Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea 
and Ghana was established to realize these objectives (Vogt, 1999). ECOWAS gave participants of 
the coup two weeks to surrender their power and peacefully hand over to President Kabbah. 
Prominent members of the OAU and Commonwealth and other international organizations referred 
to the coup as out of fashion and a “retrogressive step”. They urged the coup leaders to respect world 
opinion and return power to the legitimate government and also expressed support for whatever 
measures needed to restore the country’s elected leadership and parliament (Olamunmi, 1998). 
For a brief timeframe, a series of peace accords between the junta and ECOWAS there was much 
optimism after a broad agreement was reached for reinstatement of Kabbah. Nonetheless not long 
after, hope was shattered due to the lack of faith shown by the AFRC and Koroma. Koroma went 
further to make a statement on national radio and television saying that he will not handover until 
2001 (Omagu, 2001).  ECOWAS, along with ECOWAS Secretariat made recommendations that an 
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) be established in Sierra Leone. It was referred 
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to as ECOMOG II and was aimed at immediately reinstating the Kabbah government (ECOWAS 
Summit, 1997). In February 1998, the Nigerian led ECOMOG, implemented the mandate given to it 
by ECOWAS. Aided by the Sierra Leone Civil Defense Force (CDF) and led by Sam Hinga Norman, 
they removed the military junta and President Kabbah, who had been forced to seek refuge in Guinea 
was reinstalled on 10 March 1998.  
The Kabbah government took quickly to reprimanding individuals involved in the coup. Many were 
sentenced to jail and some were executed. The rebel leader, Foday Sankoh was exiled from Nigeria.  
Rebel attacks continued in early January 1999, the RUF was able to regain control of more than half 
of the country. The RUF’s alliance with AFRC as well as disgruntled members of the Sierra Leonean 
Army made this group large enough to launch a brutal attack on Freetown. Within less than two 
weeks, it was able to seize the center of the city including Government House and the port of 
Freetown. Considering this, Kabbah was forced to reopen negotiations with the rebels to put a stop 
to any further violence (Osita, 2006). The release of Foday Sankoh as a precondition for RUF troops 
to observing a ceasefire for one week. Even though ECOMOG increased its troops from 4,000 to 
12,000 and was able to recapture parts of Freetown, RUF still remained in control.  
In early April 1999, President Kabbah opted to continue on the path of resolution with the RUF and 
on May 18, 1999 the government of Kabbah and the RUF signed a ceasefire agreement, which came 
into effect on May 24, 1999. Shortly thereafter, the Lomé Peace Accord of July 7, 1999 between the 
RUF and the government of Sierra Leone was signed. The agreement stated that all hostile activities 
be stopped, that there be safe and unrestricted access by humanitarian organizations to all people in 
need, immediate release of prisoners and that RUF be considered a political party with Foday Sankoh 
as the Vice Chairman under Kabbah as well as the Chairman of a Commission for the Management 
of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (Reno, 2000). 
On 22 October 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established by 
the Security Council to aid in realizing the Lomé Peace Agreement. The UNAMSIL was also 
expected to aid in the application of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration plan (DDR) 
(Reno, 2000). On the 18th of January 2002, after numerous confrontations between UNAMSIL and 
rebel groups, two cease-fire agreements signed in November 2000 and in May 2001 in Abuja, for the 
purpose of renewing the DDR plan, Kabbah declared the end of the decade-long  
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civil war (World report, 2009). In March 2002, the four-year state of emergency was lifted, and 
political activities begun moving forward towards multi-party elections. Kabbah and his Sierra Leone 
People’s Party were re-elected on the 14th of May 2002 for an additional five-year term through fairly 
peaceful elections. By the end of 2002, the UNAMSIL completely disarmed over forty-seven 
thousand combatants (World report, 2009). 
Despite the general success in resolving the conflict in Sierra Leone, ECOMOG faced several difficult 
issues during this crisis. Firstly, the GDP and GNP per capita of Sierra Leone was among the lowest 
in West Africa. In fact, bad political and economic management were main reasons for the Sierra 
Leonean crisis. Therefore, it is no surprise that economic reform programs set up by President Kabbah 
were met with great opposition by ruling elites who thrived at the expense of economic collapse. The 
country was not in the position to finance ECOMOG mission but fortunately, financial support was 
given by the UK, European commission, World Bank, UN observers as well as ECOWAS members 
Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea. On the other hand, the RUF rebels controlled several diamond mines and 
used the proceeds to fund their activities. They also received significant levels of support from 
Burkina Faso and Liberia in arming and training the rebels. Failure to make adequate arrangements 
before the deployment of troops almost always leads to the dependence on international assistance.  
The second issue would be the unfamiliarity with Sierra Leonean topography.  ECOMOG was unable 
to defeat the rebels and gain control of the surrounding country side due to, but not solely because of, 
unfamiliarity with the environment, which was better known by the rebels. The rebel’s guerrilla 
tactics in addition to the densely-forested region in the north eastern part of the country were much 
more an advantage to the rebel’s than superior fire power was to ECOMOG. There were also 
allegations that ECOMOG forces operated autonomously on the ground due to the lack of proper 
communication between troop contributing counties. 
In addition to this, ECOMOG was said to have lacked the requisite logistical support on the ground, 
such as ammunition and transportation. Whereas on the other hand, ECOMOG was also accused for 
selling logistical support which was given to them.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The recommendations made during the ECOWAS Peace Plan created a divide between he 
Anglophone and the Francophone member states, as Francophone states, except for Guinea, opposed 
the intervention. Despite this, the military intervention was approved with ECOMOG consisting of 
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troops from member states with the exception of Togo and Mali. ECOMOG was given the command 
to reestablish law, order and justice in Liberia, to generate an environment that will permit peaceful 
humanitarian activities, and to ensure a suitable atmosphere that will encourage appropriate cease-
fire negotiations. 
ECOMOG was able to intervene in Liberia based on the PMAD, which sanctions interventions if a 
written request for assistance is made from the Head of State (the member state being attacked), which 
in this case was President Samuel Doe. Third party interventions can take many forms, such as, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, monitoring ceasefire agreements as well as ensuring all parties 
uphold the terms of the abide by the terms of the ceasefire agreements agreement.  
ECOMOG missions, depending on the conditions on the ground, could change from peacekeeping to 
peace enforcement very quickly and this was just the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Initially, 
ECOMOG intervened in Liberia as a peacekeeping force to prevent the overthrow of government, 
but as the conflict escalated and the NPFL became more violent, ECOMOG was forced to quickly 
evolve from a peacekeeping to a peace enforcement mission. Upon the signing of the 1994 defense 
pact between Sierra Leone and the Nigerian government, ECOMOG’ mandate was extended to 
include Sierra Leone and ECOMOG troops entered Sierra Leone for the purpose of peacekeeping. 
This did not last long as the RUF did not put a stop to the violence, which eventually lead ECOMOG 
to change its operation to peace enforcement instead.  
ECOMOG was able to prevail in many aspects of its mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone and 
remained a main source of security in Liberia until the end of the conflict but seeing as this was 
ECOMOG’ first missions, there were a fair share of challenges. As the nature of the deployment was 
hurried, the troops were not adequately trained for what to expect on the ground. There was also a 
lack of material for the purpose of geographical familiarization and insufficient logistics.  With 
Nigeria being highly depended on for financial support of the troops, Nigeria, as a member state was 
able to assume a very central role within ECOWAS. 
In conclusion, ECOMOG faced the same problems during both interventions because ECOWAS was 
not able to make the necessary improvements before sending troops to Sierra Leone due to lack of 
time, as both conflicts overlapped each other, and that ECOWAS, during this period was still trying 
to find its bearings within its regional security agenda.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. An analysis of The Gambian history and politics (1965- 2017), and the ECOWAS 
intervention of 2016 
4.1 Introduction  
The Gambia gained independence from its former British Colony in 1965 and has since then been 
ruled by two post-colonial leaders, Sir Dawda Jawara (1965-1994) and Yahya Jammeh (1994–2016), 
as well as faced two coups. Under the 22-year rule of Yahaya Jammeh, Gambia suffered enormous 
amounts of human rights violations, corruption and autocratic rule, with every Presidential election 
being rigged and only allowing the tyrant leader to extend his time in office.  
The 2016 Presidential election, however, yielded different results with an astonishing aftermath. 
Adama Barrow of the opposition party won the fifth Gambian presidential and with the support of 
ECOWAS, AU and the international community, was inducted.  
The main purpose of such an in-depth analysis into Gambia’s political history is to help shed more 
light on the various types of governments existing in Africa, ranging from good governance to the 
“personal rule paradigm”, created by corrupt African leaders eager to use their position in office for 
personal gain. The Gambia acts as a good example for both types of regimes. Furthermore, a 
comprehensive examination of historical events creates a better timeline. 
4.2 Introduction to Gambia’s independence, society and politics  
The Gambia (La Gambie, in French), officially known as the Republic of The Gambia, is a small 
country situated in the Western part of Africa. The Gambia, on its northern, southern and eastern side, 
borders with the Republic of Senegal, while in the West, it opens into the Atlantic Ocean with a 48-
kilometer-long opening. This small country covers an area of 10,689 square kilometers and has a 
population of 1,882,450 according to the April 2013 census (Lau and Scales, 2016). The Gambian 
capital is known as Banjul and the two largest cities are known as Serekunda and Brikama. (Refer to 
Figure 1 for the map of ECOWAS states).  
Throughout its history, Gambia has been composed of a variety of different ethnic groups, as do many 
African countries. The largest ethnicity is the Mandinka consisting of about 45% of the country’s 
population, followed by the Fula, Wolof and Jola 36% just to name a few of the 8 main ethnic groups. 
Each ethnic group preserves its own special language and tradition, which has been passed down 
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from generation to generation. Despite their differences and thanks to extensive migrations and inter-
marriages, large communities of a mixed ethnicity live very peacefully.  
In December 2015, the countries president declared the Gambia to be an Islamic state, nevertheless, 
citizens can practice any religion of their choosing and their rights are protected by article 25 of the 
constitution (Wipo.int, 1997). The Islamic religion is practiced by about 95% of the country’s 
population and majority of these practicing Muslims follow Sunni laws and traditions, whereas about 
4% represent the Christian religion, consisting mostly of Roman Catholics, Anglicans and 
Methodists. 
The Gambian culture is the product of a very diverse past and plays an important role in the lives of 
the Gambian people. Many West African countries, including the Gambia, share similar historical 
roots regarding the slave trade, to which a significant role was played by the Gambia River in the 
Gambia. River Gambia also known locally as ‘the River’ (Bute and Harmer, 1997), is outlined on 
both sides by the national border and its geographical location caused it to be a defining aspect of the 
nation’s destiny during the slave trade era, from the 15th through to the 17th century. The River 
Gambia water course flows deep into the continent making it a very lucrative site the slave display 
trade. This history has been documented by the 1977 Pulitzer Prize-winning author, Alex Haley, in 
his book ‘Roots: The Saga of an American Family’. In the United States, this book helped raise public 
awareness of African American history and inspired a broad interest in lineage and family history. 
It was to the country’s greatest misfortune, when a group of young, power hungry military officers, 
on 22nd July 1994, decided to overthrow the stable ruling democratic government of thirty years 
(Perfect, 2010), causing the smallest country in mainland Africa, a country that used to pride itself on 
being the Smiling Coast of Africa, the upholder of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the host to the African 
Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies and the world’s record groundnut exporter to take 
a turn for the worse. Until 1994, The Gambia was the only country with the longest continuously 
surviving multi-party democracy in Africa but with the help of four others, Yahya Jammeh forced the 
country to move in the opposite direction by seizing power with military help (Hughes, 2000). 
Jammeh managed not only to rule by decree, suspend the constitution and all existing political parties 
but he also successfully converted himself from a military ruler to an elected civilian president and 
retain power by further winning three presidential elections, something that not even former military 
rulers in 1996 (Perfect, 2010), for example Mathieu Kérékou (Benin),  Didier Ratsiraka (Madagascar) 
an Jerry Rawlings (Ghana) ever managed to do. Unlike his predecessor, Jammeh’s 22-year reign was 
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overcome with a variety of human rights abuses, ranging from shooting of students to disappearance 
and unlawful imprisonment to as much as witch hunting campaigns. If there were any complaints 
about the first republic’s leadership style, they would pale in comparison to what Jammeh’s 
government had to offer.  
The media, Gambia’s last upholder and defender against tyrannies and oppressors, went from relative 
freedom under the rule of law, to battered and weakened through strategic attacks, kidnappings and 
assassinations (Perfect, 2010). The loss of the independent media, as a critical voice of the people, 
brought about a high reliance on exiled Gambian journalists to fill that role as well as social media 
which has truly come to replace the independent media and also contributed to the drive for change 
during the 1st December elections. Nevertheless, Jammeh’s government did not allow this to stop 
them during their attempt to run for office a fifth time in 2016. Considering the climate of fear, which 
was a prominent feature of his reign, Jammeh seemed firmly in control with only two political parties 
present in the National Assembly. During this time, attempts to block Whatsapp were made and the 
government went further to institute a complete internet shutdown before votes were cast, even phone 
calls into and out of the country were restricted (Human Rights Watch, 2016).  
Despite all attempts by Jammeh’s government, on 1st December 2016, Adama Barrow of the 
opposition party won the fifth Gambian presidential election since 1994, when Sir Dawda Jawara was 
ousted in a military coup. After initially accepting defeat, conceding and being congratulated by 
regional and international bodies for doing so, Jammeh changed his mind a week later with claims of 
‘unacceptable voter abnormalities’ and demanded a reelection (BBC, 2016). His desperate attempts 
to hold on to power triggered a political crisis causing a state of emergency to be declared which only 
ended on 21st January 2017 when he faced the prospects of being removed through military 
intervention. This was the first time in history that ECOWAS and the AU called for the use of military 
action to be used to enforce the true results obtained through a free and fair election, while being 
supported by the international community the whole time. The events that occurred during this 
presidential election can truly be regarded as historical both in terms of governance in Africa and 
security.  
4.3 The making of a state- historical background 
The Gambia remained a Colony of Britain from 1821 to October 1963. Up until the late 1950’s, the 
Gambia was considered too small and too poor to become independent (Cooke and Hughes, 1997).  
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A trend was created by doubtful observers of the African scene and unpleasant labels such as 'a 
groundnut colony', just to mention one of the many rhetoric’s, were used to suggest to local and 
international bodies that the former British colony could not survive as a sovereign state. In addition 
to this, insinuations that the Gambia would soon be forced to merge with Senegal as means of survival 
were made, mostly based on the fact that groundnut earnings, which composed about two-thirds of 
domestic revenue, would not be enough to support the increased needs of its inexperienced public 
sector (Wright, 2007). 
Consequently, various options for its long-term future were assessed by a UN team of experts in the 
early 1960’s and recommendations that a Senegambia Federation be formed. In as much as the British 
government believed that the future of the Gambia lay in association with Senegal, the People’s 
Progressive Party (PPP) government of 1964 rejected these recommendations and the country went 
on to becoming an independent and sovereign state, along with attaining full membership of the 
Commonwealth on 18th February 1965 and further becoming a Republic in April 1970. Gambia did 
not share similar traits such as confrontation and conflict, which marked the struggle for political 
freedom as in other African states. The ‘mini-states’ smooth transition, pleased its former colonial 
master so much, that grants-in-aid were made during 1965-1975, as an expression of goodwill and 
support (Saine and Ceeay and Sall, 2013). Aid that was given in the earlier part of this period was 
used for purposes such as reducing the shortage in the administrative budget by paying the salaries 
of civil servants, financing current and uncompleted developmental projects from 1966-1967, as well 
as improving basic services such as water, electricity, transportation and telecommunications. In the 
later period, British aid was focused on the development of Gambia’s natural resources, particularly 
the agricultural sector (Touray, 2000).  
Until 1889, the British colony called British Gambia, comprised of just the Capital known as Bathurst 
(renamed to Banjul in April 1973) and a couple of dissipated settlements along the Gambia River. 
While trying to keep the French from taking control of the entire Gambian Valley, an agreement with 
the French Republic, the Anglo-French Convention of August 1889 was reached. In 1906 when 
slavery was officially abolished (Hanlon, 2007), a short clash between the British colonial powers 
and indigenous Gambians ensued, forcing the British colonial authority to establish their power more 
firmly. Due to this, the colony was made bigger, with a 'Protectorate' being announced over the 
recently procured domain, establishing the present borders of the Gambia. This new territory was 
divided for administrative purposes.    
51 
Political parties only started appearing several years after the II World War. In 1951, under the 
colonial regime’s strategy for co-operation, specially designed to prevent possible outbreaks of 
nationalistic views, which seemed as a possibility especially amongst a small percentage of western-
educated, middle-class Gambians who were quite outspoken about political issues. The three political 
parties were the Democratic Alliance Party (D.P.), established in 1951 with the help of Rev. John C. 
Faye, the Gambia Muslim Congress (G.M.C.) established in 1952 created by I. M. Garba-Jahumpa 
and Pierre Sarr N’Jie formed the United Party (U.P.) (Gailey, 1987). These political parties were only 
permitted to debate urban affairs but not rural. Restrictions such as these continued until 1960, which 
was about the same time Sir David K. Jawara, the colony’s Principal Veterinary Officer trained in 
Scotland, became leader of the People’s Progressive Party (P.P.P), which was initially known as the 
Protectorate People's Party (P.P.P.). His party was very appealing to rural voters, especially the 
Mandinka, seeing as Jawara was Mandinka himself. In as much as Jawara had a strong following, 
there was a bias of political power towards the Colony and in effect P. S. N’Jie from UP was instated 
as the first Chief Minister of Gambia in 1960. These unexpected events caused Jawara to resign from 
government, triggering a crisis that led to constitutional conferences in 1961 and later to political 
reforms in 1962. Furthermore, the overall majority of seats won by the PPP, in the Protectorate in the 
1962 election forced power to be shifted from UP to PPP, allowing Jawara to become the Gambia's 
first Prime Minister. In addition, it is important to state that in general, the pace of constitutional 
reform increased tremendously after World War II and subsequently the United Kingdom granted 
full internal self-governance the following year to Gambia after the general elections in 1962. 
The PPP further strengthened its position thanks to its superior governmental resources and was even 
able to convert seven of thirteen elected UP Members of Parliament (MPs).  
4.4 The Jawara era (1965-1994) 
The Gambia gained its independence and acquired its own head of government, with the Queen of 
England occupying the position of head of state, through a referendum on 18th February 1965. 
Gradually, the PPP made progress and won more seat at the general elections in 1966 and 1972. Up 
until 1994, it was one of the few countries in the sub-region that enjoyed a stable form of democracy 
(Denton, 1998). In the 1972 elections, opposing parties mostly comprised of Independent candidates, 
who had not been given the PPP nomination. These candidates were able to get a fifth of the total 
votes during the elections, which was an indication that there was some dissatisfaction with the 
current party. On 7th September 1975, the National Convention Party (NCP) was launched, led by 
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Sheriff M. Dibba, who was the both the Vice-President and Minister of Finance of the PPP in 1970. 
Upon losing favour with President Jawara, he was sacked in July 1975 (Cooke and Hughes, 1997).  
The NCP gained majority of its support from Mandinka around Central Baddibu and also urbanized 
areas around the capital. This was no surprise as Dibba had been MP for Baddibu and thus was 
considered to have a strong hold in that area. The large amount of support from singular ethnic groups 
caused the NCP to be branded ‘tribalist’. This reference was widely accepted especially amongst PPP 
supporters, whose politics at that time were to promote minority ethnic groups within society as a 
means of integration (Wright, 2007). Despite the fervent campaigning by the NCP, PPP won and 
Jawara was re- elected President.  
4.4.1 The 1981 coup 
Prior to the next elections in 1982, The Gambia was attacked. At dawn on 30th July 1981 Gambia 
was caught by surprise by an attempted coup. The Gambia with its high levels of constitutionalism, 
tolerance and lack of an army as a safeguard against such attacks was hit by civilian radicals (Touray, 
2000). It should be noted that the inspiration for these events were taken from the actions of Flight-
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings's capture of Ghanaian state power in 1979 and Master-Sergeant Samuel 
Doe's overthrow of the Tolbert Government in Liberia. The attempted coup occurred during the time 
President Jawara was attending the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana in London. In an 
attempt to suppress the coup, Jawara called for 150 Senegalese troops to help re-establish order 
(Hughes, 1981). Despite their mutual defence agreement of 16 years, many found their enthusiasm 
and readiness to cross sovereign boarders as a form of meddling. The Organization of African Unity’s 
Charter supported these allegations by stressing the importance and necessity of respecting boarders 
of all member-states and their rights to self- determination (Dash, 1981). Senegal's intervention was 
further compared to invasions of Uganda by Tanzania in 1979 and similar events in Chad in 1980 
(Hughes, 1983). For others, the Senegalese intervention was a justifiable acted based on shared 
security interests.  
There were many reasons for the coup but all these reasons being considered, the underlying cause 
were the difficulties that the economy faced.  
After these events, Senegal started showing its territorial interests in Gambia even more by presenting 
the idea of synchronization of their military forces and before long the Senegambia Confederation 
was signed as the price for Senegalese intervention (Hughes, 1992).   
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The Nominal Confederation called ‘Senegambia’ was formed between Senegal and the Gambia in 
November 1981 and lasted until 1989. The terms of agreement were: the integration of  the military 
and security forces, the coordination of foreign policies, the formation of an economic and monetary 
union and the establishment of confederal institutions (Fishman, 1981). The agreement stipulated that 
each country would maintain its independence but Gambia being so small and surrounded by Senegal 
had growing concerns over its autonomy. These concerns in addition to several others led to the 
dissolution of the confederation (Sanyang and Camara, 2017). 
It was alleged that the NCP had supported the coup thus many NCP members including Dibba, were 
arrested. He was later found innocent.  
The Gambia People’s Party (GPP) and the People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and 
Socialism (PDOIS), in addition to the PPP contested the 1987 election (Cooke and Hughes,1997). 
Both parties were formed in 1986, the GPP by three rebellious ex-PPP associates and PDOIS by a 
group of radical intellectuals but Jawara once again won elected president, with 59 per cent of votes 
in his favour. In December 1991, Jawara spoke of his intentions to step down before the elections but 
was convinced otherwise. He went on to facing four other candidates and winning the presidency 
again in 1992.  
4.4.2 Economic and social governance under Jawara 
From the time Gambia obtained its autonomy to the mid 1970’s, the Gambian economy was one of 
the fastest growing economies in the sub-region. Within the 16-member regional grouping, its per 
capita GDP was ranked third. The high demand, output and high world prices resulted in large 
amounts of groundnut production and export which increased the foreign exchange reserves. But 
during the 1970’s, subsequent turn of events led to a decline in the Gambia’s economy.  
Issues regarding but not limited to the world oil crisis of 1973, prolonged Sahelian drought in the 
early 1970s, and the increase in government expenditure led to the collapse of the country’s economy 
by the mid 1980’s. The country faced inflation and had to implement an Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP), a programme quite commonly resorted to in the past is as is even today. The ERP 
focuses on adjusting the structure of the economy.  This programme lasted for four years and did 
bring with it some positive effects although the government had to resort to economizing and making 
cuts on public service expenditure (McPherson and Radelet, 1996). 
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Significant improvements were made in the sector of education after independence. Even though the 
number of educated girls to boys was far from equal (Chant, 2007), enrolments into secondary school 
and literacy amongst adults had improved. A lot of improvements were also made in the health sector. 
Life expectancy at birth rose from 32 in 1960 to 53 in 1996. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said 
about the level of poverty in the country. Not many measures were taken until the 1990’s to eradicate 
poverty.   
The Jawara government is said to have had the best human rights record. This government always 
had a high tolerance for political opposition (Haynes, 1991). No attempts were ever made at 
introducing a one-party state, elections were always considered to be free and fair, at least on the part 
of the PPP and the government did not encourage the use of violence, protests or force in events of 
unfavourable outcomes. The Jawara government also ensured that due legal processes were always 
followed in trails and he often converted death sentences imposed by the courts in trails regarding 
acts of treason. Jawara eventually abolished the death penalty in 1993 but Jammeh reinstated it after 
he took power in 1995 (Novak, 2013). In addition to this, he allowed for an independent press to 
function, regardless of how critical they were and also the unrestricted operation of trade unions.  
In the early 1990’s, the government started implementing new methods of rooting out 
mismanagement and corruption within the government and public sector but was unable to do this 
successfully. The patience and tolerance that the people of Gambia initially had had turned to 
dissatisfied and outrage. The wide-scale of corruption under the Jawara administration, as well as 
political halt associated with thirty years of uninterrupted PPP rule had caused citizens, especially the 
youth to support the programme of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC)led by the 
young Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh in 1994 (Loum, 2002).    
4.4.3 The 1994 Coup and Jawara’s defeat  
Only two years after the ruling PPP government had been returned to power in an election that was 
deemed by international observers, the fairest election in the West African country's history, a military 
coup took place. This coup brought the most open political systems in sub-Saharan Africa to an end. 
The coup which took place in July 1994, was orchestrated by a group of young army officers who 
seized power, claiming to have done so in the name of 'democracy'. They described themselves as 
'soldiers with a difference' and promoted their agenda of restoring democracy in their country, along 
with accountability and transparency. They believed that the Jawara administration which had been 
power since 1965 had come to a standstill in many aspects of governmental and social development, 
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with much attention being drawn to corruption and its wide-scale tolerance (Wiseman and Vidler, 
1995). 
There were also grievances of a more personal nature on the part of the soldiers as well as collective 
dissatisfaction with the large number of Nigerian soldiers in the Gambian army (Loum, 2002).   
This new reform programme gained a lot of support especially from the younger generation. 
Unfortunately for Jawara, his supporters upon realizing that no intervention would be taking place to 
suppress the coup, decided to stay silent about their views and those who were initially against 
military regimes were willing to give their approval.   
The overthrown was a brief and bloodless (Loum, 2002). It was orchestrated by Yahya Jammeh, Sana 
Sabally, Sadibou Hydara, Edward Singhateh and Yankuba Touray, with Jammeh at the head of the 
rebellion. Yahya Jammeh joined Gendarmerie, a branch of the security services that implored a 
French-styled paramilitary force training which took place in Senegal soon after the 1981 confederal 
agreement. In early 1994, he became the head of the Military Police and with additional US military 
leadership training, was able to form his military group (Yeebo, 1995). 
This time around, the Senegalese government refused to send military reinforcement to restore Jawara 
to power. Since the dissolution of the Senegambia Confederation in 1989, President Abdou Diouf of 
Senegal was unwilling to support Gambia further considering Gambia’s to develop a closer 
relationship.  Nevertheless, Diouf was willing to grant asylum to Jawara and other ministers who had 
managed to escape (Saine, 2008). The international community was also not willing to do much to 
assist Jawara and the PPP government was dissolved. 
4.5 Political developments under Jammeh 
Upon removing the PPP from government, Jammeh and the AFPRC started setting their plan into 
action. Firstly, the AFPRC smothered Gambians with all sorts of promises, such as root and branch 
reform of government, punishment of corrupt politicians, eradication of corruption and new strategies 
for the improvement of the economy. A few days after the coup a new cabinet consisting of a civilian 
majority was appointed. Upon coming to power in 1994, Jammeh ruled only by decree (Hughes, 
2000). He suspended the 1970 constitution, banned all existing political parties, arrested all members 
of the government that were still in the country and took full control of the media 
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Jammeh was widely criticized for his decision to allow the military to remain in power for four years 
before transitioning back to a civilian government. Considering this, Jammeh appointed a National 
Consultative Committee (NCC) in November 1994 which recommended that a two-year transition 
period would be a better option. Initially, he refused their recommendation, which then led to a coup 
attempt by two out of five members of the military council of the AFPRC, Sana Sabally and Sadibou 
Hydara who were opposed to Jammeh’s political agenda and tried to take over the government in 
January 1995 but were caught and jailed for nine years. Upon these events, Jammeh was forced to 
accept the NCC’s recommendation and a new constitution was drawn up by a Constitutional Review 
Commission. Through a referendum held in August 1996, the new constitution was recognized and a 
presidential election was held in September (Hughes, 2000). 
Prior to the 1996 elections, Jammeh lifted a partial ban on political parties, not including the PPP and 
most other pre-coup political parties. To be able to take part in the elections, Jammeh resigned from 
the GNA, transformed himself into a civilian politician and stood as a candidate of a new party known 
as the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) with he formed (Perfect, 2010). 
With the help of professional campaigning managers and full control of the national media, Jammeh 
won the presidency.  
During his first term, Jammeh designated several trusted members of his party to oversee the 
dismantling of the system of traditional tribal chiefs. In the Gambia, as in many African countries, 
chiefs play a very important role in imparting and upholding the socio-cultural values within the 
community and especially among various ethnic groups. The norm in the process of electing a chief 
is done by the people of the community choosing someone from within their community to represent 
them but Jammeh, exercising his personal authority, selected candidates based on their loyalty to him. 
He did this with the aim of centralizing regional power (Saine, 2002). In addition to this, he removed 
all army officers from ethnic groups outside his preference and replaced them with members of his 
own ethnic group.  
At the parliamentary level, Jammeh imposed a new way of appointing cabinet members. He alone 
could elect and fire anyone at will. Assembly members were no longer selected by their respective 
communities but by Jammeh and his party executives. Within the Gambian judiciary sector, many 
Gambian judges, court officers, magistrates and prosecutors made decisions independently on cases 
on trial so Jammeh commenced hiring judges and prosecutors of his liking. These foreigners were 
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from member states such as Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon, and were tasked with making decisions 
that favoured Jameeh in political cases they were assigned (Saine, 2000). 
During the next presidential election Jammeh allowed the participation of political parties that had 
not taken part in the 1996 elections to do so. Thus, the PPP led by former minister Omar A. Jallow, 
NCP led by Sheriff Dibba and GPP led by Assan Musa Camara took part in the 2001 elections. Many 
assumed that some opposition parties would unite behind a single candidate in order to increase their 
chances at winning, but this did not happen. Jammeh again took advantage of state resources and the 
media to aid in his campaign. In addition to this, external observers of the election recorded that 
several Senegalese and Guinea-Bissau citizens had taken to the poles and voted in favour of Jammeh. 
There were also reports of threats and violence during this period. Despite all these discrepancies the 
international community did not call for a re-election. The APRC won 45 out of 48 seats (Hughes, 
2000). 
Realizing that there is unity in strength, all the major opposition parties came together to establish a 
formal coalition in January 2005. This coalition was called the National Alliance for Democracy and 
Development (NADD). Initially it was a success but as the 2006 presidential elections drew closer a 
big issue arose, as members failed to agree on a presidential candidate (Saine, 2008). Halifa Sallah, a 
PDOIS leader was selected but unhappy with the result, the UDP, the NRP and the PPP left the 
coalition. With 67 per cent of the votes, Jammeh won again, leaving the NADD’s plan unsuccessful 
(Saine, 2008). After these elections, Sallah stood down as presidential candidate for the NADD.  
In November 2011, Jammeh was again re-elected as president for a fourth term in office (BBC, 2011). 
Despite his violent and authoritarian manner of leading, he reportedly won this election having 
received 72% of the popular vote. With major reports of human rights abuse and unfair elections, not 
much was done by the international community.  
The transition of power and the continuance of the Jammeh regime was not a very smooth one. The 
military was allowed to commit violent acts of murder and torture against but not limited to political 
opponents. The murder of the Finance Minister Ousman Koro Ceesay and the execution of 14 
students during a mass protest demanding for justice for student victims of killings and rape, are just 
two of many atrocities committed (Freedom News Paper, 2016). Unfortunately, all culprits found to 
have committed any of such crimes were covered by the state. 
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Jammeh’s strategy of using violence to inspire fear among his people was an ongoing reality and 
Amnesty International did nothing to amend the negative impression this created within the 
international community.  
The oxymoron of this situation would be that the position the military regime took in terms of 
democratic values turned out to be completely different in practice. Firstly, it replaced a functioning 
democracy, with a direct military rule, then staged presidential and parliamentary elections (Perfect, 
2010). Instead of keeping to the idea of doing away with unwanted structures of the previous 
government, they retained many of the inadequacies and even added more elements of undemocratic 
rule. The realities of post-transition politics were in complete contradiction to the whole concept of 
democracy. In line with this flawed process of democratic transition, The Gambia’s political situation 
did not meet the criteria discussed in David Beetham's 'Democratic Audit' (Beetham, 1993). 
4.5.1 Economic and social developments under Jammeh 
The economy in the Gambia has always been dependent on international trade for its domestic 
revenue which it obtains from taxes imposed on imported goods from abroad and on the principal 
export crop, groundnut. The Gambia made a lot of progress in terms of economic development since 
the 1985 with the formation of the Economy Recovery Programme (ERP) and the Programme for 
Sustained Development (PSD), alongside multilateral and bilateral donors such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Sallah, 2008).  
Despite the fact that the 1994 coup caused Gambia’s external donors to impose sanctions that affected 
the country’s economy, these sanctions ended up being of a temporary nature and as soon as they 
were lifted, improvements in economic growth were seen. During the first ten years of Jammehs 
government, general economic conditions were fairly stable but even so, Gambia still lagged behind 
many middle-income countries (Chant, 2007). In order to improve revenue flow, activities such as 
tourism and re-export trade were sort after in addition to primary agricultural system. During the 
Jawara era, tourism was not a very developed idea and it was not considered to ever become one of 
the main revenue generating sectors. 
The Jammeh regime did not changed much of the economic policies that were used by its forerunner 
apart from one significant development, the launch of ‘Vision 2020’.  
This was done in 1996, with the goal of transforming Gambia into a more dynamic middle-income 
country by 2020. In the 90’s with pressure from external donors, it became necessary for Gambia to 
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lay out a clear strategy of how it planned to achieve a higher socio-economic standard of living of 
The Gambian. Through national consensus and assured countrywide support and massive 
participation "The Gambia Incorporated...... Vision 2020" was launched (IBP, Inc., 2014, 80)  
The weaknesses were identified and addressed properly to achieve the national development 
objectives. Strengths and potentials were also identified and methods of improving them were made 
for a better national socio-economic advancement (Hughes and Perfect, 2008). 
The fundamental objective of the Vision 2020 was to transform Gambia socially, economically and 
scientifically into a dynamic middle-income country, over a 25-year period.  
The plan was (IBP, Inc., 2014); 
• To develop a Financial centre, create a paradise tourist destination and a thriving export-led 
agricultural and manufacturing nation. 
• Recognize the limitations of the Government’s role in the correction of market failures. 
• Provision of public goods which cannot be produced by the private sector. 
• Establishing a self-reliant and enterprising population. 
• Reconfirming its pro-private sector stance for assistance in economic development. 
Progress to date has, however, been very limited. 
Policies in the sector of education have also remained quite similar or the first and second republic. 
During the Jammeh regime, efforts to reduce the gender gap were made as well as increasing school 
enrolment. The University of The Gambia was also built in 1999 (Perfect, 2010). The number of 
hospitals were increased during the second republic, even though more could have been done about 
the treatments of certain diseases such as HIV/AIDS.  
In terms of poverty reduction, not much was done, in fact in 2003 the 61 per cent of the population 
was classified as poor. Standards of living in the Gambia especially in the early 2000’s were not only 
poor but with the lack of freedom of speak, human rights laws being violated, and general lack of 
economic opportunities forced thousands of young people to travel abroad to Europe and America in 
search of better economic and social conditions (Jallow, 2006). 
Apart from this, there were so many attacks carried out by Jammeh’s government that in June 2016, 
that a report named “Dangerous to Dissent” was published by Amnesty International, highlighting 
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the continues vicious torture many had to face at the hand of Jammeh’s soldiers as well as at Jammeh 
command (Amnesty International, 2016).  
Amnesty International insisted that ECOWAS take action to ensure that human rights rules were 
observed. It also urged ECOWAS to launch a Commission of Inquiry into the repression of opposition 
protests and other acts of injustice carried out by Jammeh. Arms trafficking, smuggling and drug 
trafficking have also been reported to have taken place in Gambia (Amnesty International, 2016). The 
New Millennium Airlines in The Gambia was alleged to have smuggled guns and blood diamonds 
within Charles Taylor’s RUF network and based on this, was sanctioned in the 2004 UN Security 
Council resolution (Perfect, 2010). Not all accusations are based on speculation. According to Polish 
arms trafficker Konrad Dadak, during his apprehension and arrest in Spain 2016, he confessed to 
local authorities that he used Jammeh’s private to transport illegal arms to buyers.  
The media was not granted the freedom it initially was given by the first republic after the coup. The 
Gambian people always relied on the media for truthful reports on government activities such as 
reports on the corrupt practices of senior members of the Jawara era. Reporters were even willing to 
present evidence of their finding at trials, as did the editor of The Torch newspaper during the trial 
against the sitting vice president in the mid-1980s (All Africa News, 2007). 
However, Jammeh, preferred to have full control of the media, and ordered attacks, assassinations, 
arson and kidnapping whenever he felt he was disobeyed. As the community of exiled professional   
journalists grew, Gambians started replying on information published by Gambian journalists living 
in exile abroad (Perfect, 2010) 
In 2016, social media had become Gambia’s independent media source. Social media contributed 
greatly to the drive for change in the December 2016 elections (Human Rights Watch, 2016). During 
this period, Jammeh resorted to blocking WhatsApp and the virtual private networks (VPN) (Petesch, 
2016). When this did not work, he went as far as imposing a complete nationwide internet shutdown 
and forced telecommunication networks to disable all phone calls into and out of the country during 
the voting period.  
4.6 The 2016 presidential election 
Since Jammeh’s first presidential win, he has continued to win each presidential election with an 
increasing majority, but none of which have been free or fair. It would have seemed that at the 
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beginning of 2016, Jammeh was in fully control, with domination over the other political parties and 
the climate of fear more prominent that ever before (Kennedy, 2016). 
The extent of occurrences of human rights abuses were highlighted with more unexplained deaths, 
disappearances and detentions without trial, which were all condemned by Juan E. Méndez, the 
United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur (Human Rights Watch, 2015). The 
UDP, after demonstration which were deemed illegal and torture and death of a prominent youth 
leader and the sentencing of other UDP leaders to jail fatally weakened the UDP, leaving seven other 
opposition parties – the NRP, the PPP, the Gambia Moral Congress, the Gambia Democratic Congress 
(GDC), the National Convention Party (NCP), the Gambia Party for Democracy and Progress, and 
the people’s Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS), which were deemed 
ineffective in the writing of Perfect David in the 5th edition of Historical Dictionary of The Gambia 
2016. He also critiqued their inability to present a united front as a strategy to fight Jammeh (Perfect, 
2016). 
In February 2016, the APRC selected Jammeh to run as their candidate and was apparently endorsed 
by over 200,000 party supporters. During this very time, the opposition parties attempted to unit and 
in mid-October, seven out of eight opposition political parties, excluding the GDC, agreed that a 
single candidate be elected to represent the opposition, something that they never managed to do in 
previous elections (Ndow, 2016). This coalition was called The Gambia Opposition for Electoral 
Reform (GOFER). Out of the five eligible candidates was Dr Isatou Touray, the first woman and a 
prominent gender activist. Adama Barrow was elected as the UDP’s presidential candidate in 
September 2016 and at the end of October, the seven opposition parties assembled in Banjul to elect 
their flag bearer, Adama Barrow (The Point, 2016). As per election rules, a presidential candidate 
could not represent two political parties simultaneously, so Barrow was required to stand as an 
independent candidate by resigning from the UDP on 3 November (Africa Research Bulletin, 2016). 
The coalition had two main strategies for their progression during the time leading up to elections, 
the first was to boycott the elections and the second was to contest them following with civil 
disobedience. The coalition also made effective use of social media to mobilize support.  
The role of the diaspora in the 2016 presidential election process was very crucial. As many of them 
were in opposition to Jammeh reign, they were never given the right to vote and some even had family 
members kidnapped or beaten for actions that were displeasing to Jammeh (Human Rights Watch, 
2016). Nevertheless, many of the members of the diaspora were very active on social media and when 
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the time came for the 2016 elections, through the crowdfunding platform Go-FundMe, they were able 
to raise over $50,000 in support of the opposition campaign in just 24 days. The main purpose for the 
use of this fundraising tool was due to the pre-election ECOWAS assessment mission, which assessed 
the need for addition funding to aid restore the vast resource imbalance between the current party and 
the opposition. This was also a pressing issue in the 2011 elections.  
Instead of trying to meet the demands or find a suitable settlement with the opposition, Jammeh felt 
it better to implement his own reforms, which of course were to his advantage. Firstly, he raised the 
presidential candidates deposit from GMD 10,000 to GMD 1 million, which triggered a very negative 
reaction from international observers, forcing Jammeh to reduce it to GMD 500,000. He didn’t stop 
there, he imposed on-the-spot vote counting and a strategy to contest the elections if the need arose 
(Perfect, 2017).  
In addition to the above, the opposition parties had never received any form of security or protection 
from the government during campaigns. Opposition party members are left to seek personal 
protection by hiring private security guards from Senegal, who according to Gambian law are not 
permitted to carry arms in Gambia. This was a strategy implemented to prevent them from being able 
to provide maximum security to their clients. Adama Barrow, the 2016 president elect and his team 
were forced to adhere to this method of protection as well with instances of intimidation throughout 
the entire electoral process by the military, the police, and even the intelligence services being 
recorded and documented by election observers and Human Rights groups (Amnesty International, 
2016). Under Jammeh’s regime, even the slightest sign of any independent political activity called 
for repression and it was through this tactic that Ousainou Darboe, the opposition leader, ended up in 
prison alongside 19 other politicians for participating in a peaceful demonstration that called for 
political reforms in April 2016. 
The election campaign took place between the 16th and 29th of November and voting took place on 
the 1st of December. The number of registered voters had increased from 796,929 registered voters 
in 2011 to 886,578 in 2016 (Perfect, 2017).  
Barrow’s campaign consisted of, but was not limited to, an economic revival, as well as a program 
of complete change. He called for constitutional reforms, including limiting a president to serve only 
two consecutive terms in government, restoration of an independent judiciary, allowing for an 
independent media and the ending of corruption in both the public service and private sectors 
(Chantzaras, 2016). 
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Based on all previous elections, it was no surprise that Jammeh showed an ample amount of 
confidence during the 2016 election. ECOWAS officially began thoroughly observing all national 
elections in member states after the ECOWAS Commission created the Electoral Assistance Unit in 
2005. Nevertheless, external observers always require an invitation, which rather unexpectedly was 
not granted to the ECOWAS Observation Team during the 2016 election. Despite this, predictions 
for a win were made in Jammeh’s favour. Despite the change in the attitudes of the opposition and 
the predictions of the external observers, there was much less malpractice in the 2016 presidential 
elections, which was partially attributed to the new ‘on-the-spot’ ballot counting strategy (Hartmann, 
2017).  
On 2nd December 2016, under the plurality electoral system, when the IEC chairman declared 
Barrow the winner with 263,515 votes (45.5%), Jammeh with 212,099 (36.7%) and a third candidate 
winning the remaining 17% (BBC, 2016), Gambian’s as well as external observers were stunned.  
After three days the IEC declared a miscount with revised results showing that Barrow’s vote was 
now 227,708 (43.3%) and Jammeh’s was 208,487 (39.6%).  
Barrow had gained over 50% of the total votes cast in 19 constituencies. Jammeh on the other hand 
was shown loyalty by his fellow Jola people from the Foni constituencies. In other areas, he had next 
to no votes.  
With the unavailability of voting opinion polls, it is difficult to say with much certainty, however, 
many voters had strong opinions about the large number of Gambian migrants and asylum seekers 
abroad and the high levels of brain drain. In addition to this many young Gambians living abroad 
wanted to but could not return home due to the limited future they saw for themselves in Gambia thus 
it can be presumed that a large portion of Barrow’s voters were a younger generation of urban voters, 
who were tired of dealing with failed economic policies implemented by Jammeh’s. 
In addition, Jammeh managed to ostracize the Mandinka ethnicity by referring to them as his enemies 
and foreigners, as well as made bold threats to kill them (Saidykhan, 2016). Seeing as the Mandinka 
ethnicity comprise about thirty per cent of the Gambian population, it can also be speculated that a 
large portion of Barrow’s votes also came from here. The disdain felt towards Jammeh didn’t end 
with the ethnic groups but was very much present amongst many Muslims, and the minority Christian 
community, who strongly opposed Jammeh’s manipulation of the Islamic religion for the purpose of 
reaping political gain.  
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4.7 ECOWAS intervention in the Gambian political crisis  
After the whole nation and external observers were informed of the results of the election, Jammeh, 
to the surprise of many, made an opened gesture and accepted his defeat in a televised statement, 
where he was congratulated by ECOWAS, together with the AU and the UN Official Representative 
for West Africa as he promised not to contest the results. This unfortunately did not last long, as only 
7 days later, on the 9th of December Jammeh retracted his acceptance and called for another election 
claiming that there were ‘unacceptable abnormalities’ during the election (Hartmann, 2017). 
ECOWAS, together with the AU and the UN Official Representative for West Africa in January 2017 
recognised Barrow’s government as the only legitimate government and when Jammeh retracted his 
acceptance of Barrow’s win, ECOWAS did not waste time in calling for a recount but stated that the 
outcome of the election be accepted and respected. Jammeh, not heeding any advice, sort to organize 
a rebel army to overthrow the new government (MaClean, 2016). During this time, radio interviews 
were made with promises for immediate inquiries into Jammeh’s human rights abuses. 
The AU demanded for Jammeh’s resignation, whereas his retraction was not only considered 
unacceptable by ECOWAS but also a threat to the peace within and around Gambia. Liberian 
president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the chair of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and 
Government, condemned his action and insisted measures be taken before the entire West African 
sub-region’s stability is put in jeopardy (ECOWAS, 2016).  So, on the 13th of December, Sirleaf, as 
the appointed ECOWAS mediator, along with the presidents of Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, 
John Dramani Mahama, Muhammadu Buhari and Ernest Bai Koroma respectively, travelled to Banjul 
to negotiate Jammeh’s handover but following failure to do so realized the need to adopt more 
credible sanctions and later returned with the threat of military intervention.  
The APRC security forces resorted to measures such as seizing and controlling the IEC office while 
having its personnel locked out. Four independent radio stations were also shut down while the APRC 
continued to challenge the election results (Perfect, 2017) 
Since the Supreme Court could not reconvene until the next regular session which was scheduled to 
be in May, Emmanuel Fagbenle, the only Chief Justice available refused to rule in favour of Jammeh 
and allowed Barrow’s inauguration to continue as planned.  
Not taking this news well, on 17 January, Jammeh declare a 90-day state of emergency following his 
decision to remain in power until the Supreme Court would reconvene to hear his petition, which was 
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illegal according to the constitution. As this political crisis unravelled, many Gambian civilians chose 
to leave the country to avoid any possible occurrence of violence, whereas some APRC members, 
Gambian ambassadors, and cabinet ministers decided to show support for Barrow.   
Upon Barrows inauguration, it became an obligation for ECOWAS to find means of enforcing the 
handover of power. Further negotiations with Jammeh in Banjul ended without Jammeh agreeing to 
step down, so ECOWAS placed standby forces on alert. As the official date for the handing over of 
power approached, the use of military intervention changed from being just a threat to becoming a 
realistic means to an end. During the France–Africa Summit in Bamako, Ibn Chambas, UN Special 
Representative announced that ECOWAS would request that the UN Security Council approve the 
deployment of troops to The Gambia in case Jammeh refused to surrender power and based on this 
(Vanguard, 2017), ECOWAS chiefs of staff established the ECOWAS Military Intervention in The 
Gambia (ECOMIG) on the 14th of January in Abuja. 
Barrow was confirmed as president on the 19th of January at the Embassy of Gambia in Dakar, during 
which time ECOWAS military forces moved towards the Gambian border though Senegal, alongside 
a Nigerian warship moving through Gambian waters. On this very day, Resolution 2337 was 
approved by the UN Security Council which granted full support for ECOWAS to enforce the will of 
the people expressed through the ballots cast on 1st December 2016 (United Nations, 2017). Even 
though troops were on standby, the Security Council did not explicitly approve military action 
according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
During final negotiations between Jammeh and the presidents of Guinea and Mauritania, Jammeh 
agreed to step down under the fear of impending military action. 
Since Barrow denied him any opportunity of staying in Gambia after his acquiescence, Jammeh was 
forced into exile (Oladipo, 2017).  Subsequently, as per President Barrows request, ECOMIG stayed 
in Gambia for three months as a safety measure.   
Jammeh moved to Equatorial Guinea after a deal made by the AU, UN, and ECOWAS. Currently 
Equatorial Guinea does not recognize the International Criminal Court (ICC), therefore, Jammeh 
cannot be extradited if the ICC chooses to prosecute him for his crimes against humanity. Fortunately, 
the political crisis was concluded without any blood being shed and on the 26th of January, Barrow 
arrived in The Gambia and was welcomed joyfully (Perfect, 2017). 
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4.8 Conclusion 
The government of Dawda Jawara, despite being long and industrious, was considered to have lost 
touch with the needs of ordinary Gambians and due to that was removed from power by a bloodless 
coup led by Jammeh.  President Yahya Jammeh ruled the country with an iron fist up until 2016 when 
he was defeated in a shocking election result by the main opposition candidate, Adama Barrow. After 
first conceding, Jammeh later returned demanding a recount but was forced to step down in disgrace 
as Barrow, the legitimate President of Gambia, was inaugurated with the support of the regional and 
international community. This was the end of Jammeh’s 22-year rule.  
Jammeh’s unwillingness to resign threatened the peace and security in and around Gambia and upon 
several failed attempts at mediation by ECOWAS, the decision to deploy ECOMOG troops to Gambia 
was made. Despite the fact that the UN Security Council did not give the green light for a military 
intervention, they did not oppose it either.  
Through the adoption of Resolution 2337, the UN Security Council was able to reaffirm its strong 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Gambia.  
ECOWAS military forces were very well prepared for this intervention. Apart from proper funding, 
good training and strong political will, there was very good communication between ECOMOG 
member states. Well planned tactics were employed, with military troops moving towards Gambia 
through Senegalese territory and Nigerian warships moving through Gambian waters. Regardless of 
the fact that ECOMOG did not need to resort to force, they came very well prepared as compared to 
earlier interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Judging from this, one can conclude that ECOWAS 
has made great improvement in its intervention tactics and regional security framework.   
The events in Gambia are truly historical as this is the first time ECOWAS and AU have sort to use 
military action to enforce true results obtained through a free and fair election.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. Comparison of the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and The 
Gambia 
5.1 Introduction 
ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and The Gambia took place in different eras, with 
conditions that varied from each other. In all three interventions, ECOWAS faced certain challenges, 
from which it made evaluations and amended its strategy for further conflict management and peace-
keeping.  
In this chapter, I will focus on comparing the three interventions and attempt to determine any 
similarities or differences that occurred. The comparison will also include highlights of some 
challenges that were faced, as well as measures that were taken to rectify those challenges before 
subsequent interventions.  By evaluating points such as the main causes of the conflicts, challenges 
faced, the international community’s reaction to the crisis and the efficiency and justification of 
ECOWAS interventions, I will be able to effectively distinguish each intervention from one another.  
5.2 Causes of the conflicts 
The conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone have more to do with each other than one would expect. 
Firstly, the spread of the conflict in Liberia was a catalyst for the Sierra Leonean war (Zack-Williams, 
1999). The spill over of violence from Liberia encouraged the RUF, a small band of well-armed and 
well-funded guerrilla rebels to take over territory in the eastern countryside, which led to radical 
behaviour eventually the overthrow of the elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (Gberie, 2005). 
The main reason for the Sierra Leone conflict was the desire by the rebels to take over government 
and share the countries diamonds, which are known as blood or conflict diamonds (Hirsch, 2001). 
Their greed was a major aspect of their inability to reach agreements with peacekeepers and an 
incentive to continue the conflict. With the government plagued with a weak economy full of 
corruption, its poorly trained and ill-equipped army was in no way able to withstand attacks from the 
RUF. Needless to mention, Charles Taylor, Liberia’s own rebel leader played a major role in 
providing Sierra Leonean rebels with funding for their unspeakable atrocities committed against 
civilians, such as amputating limbs, cutting off ears and lips (Gberie, 2005). 
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Liberia also faced a bloody conflict of its own, the roots causes being the Americo-Liberian 
domination in terms of political power, a severe economic decline and most crucial cause being ethnic 
marginalization especially with President Samuel Doe’s disinterest in resolving the resentment 
between Americo-Liberian and indigenous while perusing an autocratic regime which worsened the 
situation altogether (Mgbeoji, 2003). 
The cause of the conflict in Gambia was of a different nature as compared to the other two conflicts. 
The crisis in Gambia was a post-election crisis (Perfect, 2017). With President Jammeh being in 
power for 22 years and ruling the country in a completely autocratic way, the people of Gambia were 
ready for a change and this day came after the presidential elections on the 1st of December 2016 
when Jammeh was defeated by Adama Barrow, the candidate of a seven-party opposition coalition, 
formed in 2016 to increase the chance of putting an end to the tyranny of Jammeh’s government. 
After an initial acceptance of defeat, Jammeh decided to go back on his word a week later, with 
accusations of a rigged election by the Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission and 
demands for a fresh election (Perfect, 2017). His radical behaviour after this led both Gambia and the 
international community anticipating a bloody conflict, and this can be said to be the trigger for the 
constitutional crisis in The Gambia.  
5.3 The international society’s reaction  
Until a request put in by ECOWAS intreating assistance from the international community, no formal 
steps had been taken to put the conflict in Liberia to end. Several reasons for this would be the fact 
that global security issues were at a rise due to the Cold War, as well as the lack of capital and political 
desire to put much effort into an intervention.  
The United Nations, although contributing greatly to humanitarian aid and emergency relief in 
Liberia, regarded the Liberian conflict more as a regional conflict, thus, ECOWAS, as the regional 
body, was expected to play a leading role in achieving a peaceful settlement to the conflict. As 
compared to Cambodia, Haiti etc., the UN unfortunately did not play as strong a role in ensuring that 
human rights issues were observed. Nevertheless, on the 19th of November 1992, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) implemented resolution 788 (UNSCR, 1992), which called for a ceasefire 
and placed an arms restriction on Liberia. The UNSC went on to pass two more resolutions, the 
UNSCR 813 (UNSCR, 1993) implemented in March 1993 and the UNSCR 866 implemented in 
September 1993. These resolutions sanctioned the establishment of the United Nations Observer 
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), which was aimed at ending the conflict (Aboagye, 1999). 
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The civil war in Liberia complicated the crisis in Sierra Leone (Zack-Williams, 1999). The levels of 
violence continued to increase after 1991 and finally reached extreme levels May 1997 and also in 
January 1999, when the capital was hit. These events were what drew the attention of the international 
community after which the three peace accords were signed but did not yield peace. The international 
community also saw it necessary to respond to the conflict in Sierra Leone since they had already 
been involved in supporting regional body, ECOWAS, with the crisis in Liberia (Davies, 2010).  
After President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was overthrown in 1997, he appealed to General Sani Abacha, 
who was the chairman of ECOWAS, for military assistance under the Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) along with other bilateral agreements (Osita, 2006). ECOMOG troops were sent to recapture 
Freetown, which they did by February 1998 and Kabbah was restored to power, however ECOMOG 
intervention did not bring the civil war, which had been going on for seven years, to an end.  
In July 1999, the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed and the UNSC established the United Mission 
of Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), with an objective of assisting with the disarmament and enforcing the 
terms established under the agreement (Reno, 2000). Since the rebels refused to commit to the peace 
process, fighting continued. In an attempt to take control of the situation in the country, the UN 
Security Council asked the Russian Federation to assist them in a peacekeeping mission in Sierra 
Leone, to which they agreed. They succeeded in their mission left after the UN mandate for 
peacekeeping operations ended in December 2005 (UN Press, 2005).  
The British military intervened in the Sierra Leonean civil war in May 2000, when the situations on 
the ground worsened so much as to force British forces to deploy paratroopers to establish order and 
evacuate commonwealth nationals. They played a big role in the eventual restoration of a ceasefire.  
In 2006, a request was made by the UN Security Council that the Peacebuilding Commission help 
Sierra Leone develop strategies for reconstruction and restoration of the economy.  
Unlike Liberia, which experienced a hint of division between francophone and anglophone entities 
(Aboagye, 1999), when the question of the legitimacy and neutrality of ECOMOG was raised, Sierra 
Leone experienced a multipolar structure, which was a combination of francophone and anglophone 
countries, led by Nigeria, Ghana and Burkina Faso as the central characters.  
In the case of The Gambia, the international community i.e. ECOWAS, the African Union and the 
United Nations, showed a very high level of unity in their aims of achieving a peaceful and orderly 
transition (Kreß and Nußberger, 2017). In addition to this, the international community showed 
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diplomatic stride as they skilfully coordinated with the regional actors, taking into regard the 
Constitution, the laws of the Gambia and the principles of international law (Connolly and He, 2018).  
The international community not only rejected but strongly condemned Jammeh’s response to the 
2016 presidential results. ECOWAS did not waste time in calling on the Gambian government to 
abide by its constitutional responsibilities and further stated that the outcome of the election be 
accepted and respected, calling Barrow the legitimate representative for The Gambia.  With the 
backing of the Security Council, ECOWAS and AU announced that they were ready to take all 
necessary measures to resolve the issue (Perfect, 2017), expressing the availability of stand-by forces 
ready to intervene.  
Now, despite these claims, it needs to be mentioned that the Security Council did express their full 
support for the ECOWAS resolution, but with instructions that the resolution be ensured through 
political means first. Further justification for the use of force will be discussed later.  
Throughout the years, the international community was aware of the appalling leadership style of 
Jammeh and his government. Despite this, they chose to turn a blind eye. Therefore, the immediate 
reaction of the international community to the possibility of an outbreak of a civil war during the 
2016 presidential elections, could be viewed as hypocritical from one point of view.  
The UN and other regional organizations have promised to assist the new government as they make 
the democratic transition and put into action new reforms that help build a new Gambia.  
5.4 ECOWAS’ response time to the interventions  
ECOWAS response to the conflict in Liberia was the slowest out of the three cases, followed by 
Sierra Leone and lastly The Gambia.  
First formal discussion regarding the conflict in Liberia took place during ECOWAS 13th summit of 
the Heads of States in Banjul, Gambia, in May 1990, six months after the start of the conflicts (Ero, 
1995). It then took a further three months to deploy troops. Reasons for this could be attributed to the 
fact that ECOWAS had never conducted any military intervention on its own, leaving some member 
states doubtful of their possibility of success. There was also the expectation that the international 
community would intervene first, but they did not.  There was also a divide in opinion as to whether 
or not ECOWAS should intervene, with Anglophone countries in support of an intervention and 
Francophone countries opposed (Obi, 2009). By reason of this, there was a long period of blame 
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shifting between ECOWAS and the international community as to who was in the better position to 
intervene.   
In relative terms, the Sierra Leonean civil war was an extremely destructive one. ECOWAS reaction 
to the Sierra Leonean crisis was not as fast as one would have expected. If in the case of Liberia, they 
lacked experience, then in this case they lacked resources. Before an intervention can take place, the 
primary responsibility falls to the sovereign state to ensure the prevention of any violent conflicts 
(Amnesty International, 1995). If this responsibility is not met, which was the case in Sierra Leone, 
certain steps must be followed to ensure a timely prevention of the conflict by the international 
community. In order to meet these steps, much emphasis has to be placed on the systematic collection 
of data i.e. analysis of recommendations, risk assessment and information sharing but with Africa 
lacking the technological knowledge and financial assistance, ECOWAS did not have the capacity to 
gather necessary data prior to the escalations of events and unfortunately, did not have a very clear 
understanding of the initial situation in Sierra Leone (Franke, 2009). 
ECOWAS did reach out to the UN and with joint efforts, the decision to resort economic and political 
sanctions as first steps to resolving the crisis was a good idea. The UN, Commonwealth, AU and 
ECOWAS strongly supported the aim of removing the illegitimate government from power through 
peaceful means but considering the hostilities and duration of the conflict, it was difficult to perceive 
reaching a suitable outcome by using the only negotiation tactics (Obi, 2009).   
ECOWAS reaction to the conflict in Gambia was very fast. When Jammeh Yahya refused to leave 
office after the election of the new President, Adam Barrow, immediate assistance was called for to 
enforce his win (Kreß and Nußberger, 2017). The international community was quick to state their 
support for Barrow, while showing a united front (Henderson, 2018). Within two months the whole 
situation was resolved and to date, I consider this to be the most successful ECOWAS intervention 
yet.  
5.5 Determining the legality and justification for the interventions 
ECOWAS interventions in these three conflicts, despite some violations, are still considered credible 
and justifiable by the international community. The three ECOWAS interventions will be evaluated 
based on two criteria, the United Nations Charter and the ECOWAS protocols. By using these criteria, 
the legality of an intervention can be evaluated and justified. 
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The UN charter has four aims, of which maintaining worldwide peace and security is one and its 
members are bound by its articles. Article 52 of the UN Charter states that all activities of a sub-
regional body, in this case ECOWAS, must remain in line with the purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter, which insist on the use of peaceful methods to attain resolutions, i.e. the exclusion of the use 
of force, which falls under article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.  
But before going on, I would like to state that the use of force is not justified as a collective security 
measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and no individual incident can be used as a precedent 
to typify the UN Security Council’s decisions during an internal threat to democracy within the 
meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter to maintain or restore international peace. 
Sub-regional bodies are also required to obtain permission from the UNSC prior to any intervention. 
In this case, the permission to intervene would supersede the exclusion of the use of force.  
Article 54 of the UN Charter states that the UNSC be aware of any activity such as tactical strategies, 
surveys, mediations processes etc. carried out by the sub-regional body throughout the conflict 
resolution period (UN Charter, 1945). 
In addition to this, the Protocol on Mutual Assistance of Defence, Article 16 states that the Head of 
State of a member state under external armed threat or aggression may seek assistance from the 
community through a written request to the Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS, with copies to 
other Members. Finally, article 40 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, which was adopted on 10th December 1999 
in Lomé, Togo, states that ECOWAS shall intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and 
restore life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster, efficiently undertake humanitarian 
actions for the purposes of conflict prevention and management within member states (ECOWAS, 
1999). 
As mentioned above, ECOWAS violated Article 52 of the UN Charter by not attaining permission 
from the Security Council prior to the intervention in Liberia, this action was termed illegal by the 
UN Charter. ECOWAS also violated article 54 when it failed in its transparency in terms of notifying 
the UN Security Council of the deployment of troops to Liberia. They did this only after the action 
had taken place.  
Even with the violations, ECOWAS decision to intervene was on the basis of humanitarian grounds. 
Their goal was to put an end to the killings, facilitate disarmament and reintegration programmes and 
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establish suitable conditions for political, social and economic reconstruction. Therefore, from an 
over-all point of view, the work of ECOWAS was legal and can be justified. 
In the case of Sierra Leone, there have been many documented attempts by ECOWAS and the 
international community to resolve the conflict peacefully, from the beginning of the crisis in 1991 
to the time of intervention in 1998. ECOWAS played an important role during the signing of a peace 
agreement with the government in November 1996, which authorized the demobilization and 
reintegration of rebel fighters into civilian society. Unfortunately, the situation in the country did not 
become better and further measures were sort after.  
The situation in Sierra Leone was often referred to as a ‘humanitarian crisis’. Joseph Melrose 
describes the country as one “that has descended into the abyss of human degradation and abject 
deprivation”.  Further going on to describe the terror tactics used by the rebels. With eyewitness 
testimonies of instances where people were burnt alive or even thrown into burning buildings, raped, 
amputated etc. (Melrose, 2009) 
ECOWAS, in their responsibility to prevent were slow but in their responsibility to react made a lot 
of effort, especially in situations of compelling need for human rights protection. In July of 1997, 
ECOWAS Foreign Ministers met in Conakry, Guinea with representatives of the AFRC and RUF 
junta to find a settlement suitable for all parties. Upon this and several subsequent meetings, 
ECOWAS, representatives of the AU and the UN approved the decision to impose sanctions and 
enforce an embargo. After the UN Security Council was asked for approval, the Resolution 1132 was 
adopted, and legal recognition was given to the ECOWAS initiative.  
According to the UN Security Council, the use of force can only be opted for as a last resort, which 
means that the international community must be seen to have made sincere attempts to resolve the 
conflict in a peaceful manner before deciding to use military intervention.  
Prior to considering the use of force, the international community did attempt numerous peace deals, 
which in hindsight does show the commitment they put into the process of peaceful negotiations.  
Despite reservations one might have about opting for military intervention instead of negotiations, it 
is impossible to predict what would have occurred in the case of Sierra Leone, if negotiations were 
not replaced with military intervention. Needless to say, military interventions always abide by strict 
laws. The size, duration and intensity will almost always be the minimum required to ensure that the 
humanitarian objective in question can be successfully secured.  
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The official command of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone was for the ‘restoration of democracy’ but even 
without the clarification of the mandate being a humanitarian intervention, the face that Sierra Leone 
was a humanitarian crisis cannot be questioned (Nowrot and Schabacker, 1998). In this case, UN 
General Assembly, mostly based on a legalistic point of view, could not note it to be a humanitarian 
intervention, and in addition to this, the Security Council Resolution 1132 did not expressly affirm 
military intercession, however, on 26th March 1998, post military intervention, the President of the 
Security Council at that time, praised ECOWAS for bringing the rule of the rebel junta to an end and 
this is known as the ex poste facto justification. Therefore, the actions of ECOWAS were legal and 
can be justified (Nowrot and Schabacker, 1998).  
To understand the legality of The Gambia, we would first have to understand the lawfulness of the 
use of force. In the case of The Gambia, intervention by invitation under current international law 
would be examined. Intervention by invitation is when a state requests for another state to use force 
in their territory. With such a consent, the prohibition of the use of force as set out in Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter will not be encroach upon (Nolte, 2010). 
Nevertheless, there are certain requirements that have to be met. For the purpose of this thesis, I will 
only analyze one issue concerning the application of intervention by invitation, and that will be if 
Barrow was genuinely in the position to give consent to an external intervention under international 
law, thus was Barrow the legitimate ruler or Jammeh? 
Let’s assume that in order for a state to call for a pro-democratic intervention, lives of citizens would 
have to be under grave threat, consequently, there would have to be an event such as an overthrow of 
the government, but then again the situation in Gambia could not have been an overthrow or a coup 
d’état seeing as Barrow was inaugurated on the 19th of January, leaving the status quo more like a 
refusal to transfer power and less like a coup d’état (Kemp and Kinyunyu, 2017). 
This of course might seem like a rather small technicality, but in order for a pro-democratic 
intervention to be justified, there have to be very precise circumstances.  
Returning to the question of who the legitimate ruler was. The first known request for assistance by 
Barrow from ECOWAS was made during a period when Barrow was not able to enter Gambia and 
had no control over the country. Jammeh, on the other hand, also had little control over the country 
due to lack of support from the military and ally countries. In addition to this, the Security Council 
confirmed the transparency of the election, implying that they supported Barrows legitimacy to be 
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president, which was also stated in Resolution 2337 of 2017 (UNSC Resolution 2337). The UN 
Security Council’s position strengthened Barrows legitimacy over Jammeh’s. Reinforcing this, were 
statements made by Russia and the United Kingdom following Barrow’s appointment into office, 
ensuring him that it was fully in his right to invite (request) assistance from a foreign state. UK stated, 
in agreement, that “it’s very clear that if President Barrow asks for assistance, then that’s something 
as the legitimate president of Gambia he’s perfectly entitled to do.” (AP news, 2017)  
With the above-mentioned support and the resolution, the credibility of the intervention being legal 
or justified was increased.  Through further assessment, the Security Council was able to promote 
possible credibility for legal intervention under international law. These findings were included in 
Resolution 2337 and acted as a means by which the use of force for the purpose of pro-democratic 
intervention could be justified (Kreß and Nußberger, 2017).  The reader should keep in mind, that the 
UN Security Council did not approve nor condemn the request made by ECOWAS to use force but 
instead positioned themselves in favor of the legitimacy of Barrow as President, which confirmed 
that he had the authority to rule over the territory of Gambia. By doing so, the Security Council 
created the impression that if negotiations turn out unsuccessful, military troops might be sent as a 
final recourse. This case was very similar to that of the Saudi Arabia led Yemen case in March 2015, 
when the coalition of the Gulf Cooperation Council tried to intervene as a way to show support for 
President Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi. In both cases, the Security Council as a matter of principle did 
not question the intervening parties, which leads me to understand that the international community 
possibly chose to assume that intervention did not violate the exclusion of the use of force (Nußberger, 
2017).  
Besides, the lack of hard legal justification for the intervention did not change the fact that an 
intervention was indeed necessary. The only reason why the Security Council did not openly express 
their support of the intervention was to ensure that if the intervention failed, they would not be held 
accountable for granting its permission. On the other hand, in light of the intervention’s success, they 
would be able to take credit for it.  
5.6 Challenges and achievements of ECOWAS 
Despite the victorious and long-awaited resolution in the Liberian conflict, ECOWAS and ECOMOG 
faced many challenges which hindered the possibility of a much faster resolution strategy.  
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First and foremost, ECOWAS broke a fundamental basis of multilateral diplomacy, also referred to 
third party intervention. The reason being some ECOWAS members had actively facilitated the 
continuation of warfare in Liberia, while only five-member states (Anglophone states) contributed to 
sustaining the ECOMOG troops, causing the Francophone states to believe that ECOMOG was a way 
for Anglophone states to dominate the region. Weaker member states on the other hand, found 
difficulty in aiding the cause financially due to economic reforms of their own. There were also 
immense difficulties between ECOWAS and the warring parties to agree on a structure and 
composition of an interim government. This scenario displays not only multilateral diplomatic 
complications within ECOWAS as a third party but also misunderstanding between ECOWAS and 
the conflicting parties. 
Furthermore, the lack of cooperation and unity in the preliminary stages of ECOWAS peace keeping 
efforts was unhinged due to the fact that some ECOWAS members had fueled the rebellion in Liberia 
and worked to keep the Liberian crisis off the UN security Councils radar for some time. Apart from 
this, Nigeria playing a major role did not go well with some members and international players, as 
Nigeria had received sanctions and been reproached for their horrible human rights record under 
General Abacha (Kwaku and Zartman, 2000). 
Another challenge would be the fact that the mandate given to ECOMOG was extremely imprecise, 
allowing for misunderstanding of operational roles amongst ECOMOG peace keepers, oscillation 
between implied responsibilities and assumed duties, issues with neutrality and the eventual merging 
into another party to the conflict. The dual role caused tension to arise between ECOMOG and 
warring factions, Francophones and International observers (Okere, 2015, 38-39). I believe this 
played a role in deteriorating the temperament of warring parties and forcing the prolongation of the 
conflict, which initially was anticipated to be resolved within a short period of time.  
Despite all the above-mentioned challenges and failed peace agreements, ECOWAS and ECOMOG 
were able to reduce violent outbreaks, evacuate civilians, establish an interim government, facilitate 
free and fair elections and eventually bring peace. In the end, ECOWAS states overcome their 
differences and understood that maintaining security, at the end of the day, was the most important 
goal. The intervention in Liberia gave ECOWAS more confidence in their intervention in Sierra 
Leone. In spite of their great outcome, I feel the main reason for their unified action can be attributed 
to their need for preserving self-interests.  
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There were also several issues ECOMOG faced in during the crisis in Sierra Leone. Firstly, the GDP 
and GNP per capita of Sierra Leone was among the lowest in West Africa. In fact, bad political and 
economic management were main reasons for the Sierra Leonean crisis. Therefore, it is no surprise 
that economic reform programs set up by President Kabbah were met with great opposition by ruling 
elites who thrived at the expense of economic collapse. The country was not in the position to finance 
ECOMOG mission but fortunately, financial support was given by the UK, European commission, 
World Bank, UN observers as well as ECOWAS members Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea. On the other 
hand, the rebels controlled several diamond mines and used the proceeds to fund their activities. They 
also received significant level of support from Burkina Faso and Liberia in arming and training the 
rebels. Which bring me to my second issue, unfamiliarity with Sierra Leonean topography.  
ECOMOG was unable to defeat the rebels and gain control of the surrounding country side. They 
were unfamiliar with the environment, which was better known by the rebels. The rebel’s guerrilla 
tactics in addition to the densely-forested region in the north eastern part of the country were much 
more an advantage to the rebel’s than superior fire power was to ECOMOG. There were also 
allegations that troops operated autonomously on the ground due to the lack of proper communication 
between troop contributing counties. In addition to this, ECOMOG was said to have lacked the 
requisite logistical support on the ground, such as ammunition and transportation. Whereas on the 
other hand, ECOMOG was also accused for selling logistical support which was given to them.  
ECOWAS not only seeks to promote democratic development in member states, but also requires 
that member states satisfy the basic principles of good democratic governance. In addition to this, the 
2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance which entered into force in 2008, outlines 12 
constitutional principles. Articles 1b and 1c require that “every accession to power must be made 
through free, fair and transparent elections” and that there will be “zero tolerance for power obtained 
by unconstitutional means” (ECOWAS, 2001). Through this protocol, ECOWAS is given the 
mandate to impose sanctions such as interruption of decision-making rights and removal of titles 
within ECOWAS and possible interventions if seen fit by the UN Security Council and the Authority 
of Heads of State and Government. The 2001 protocol was approved by 9 out of 15-member states 
which included Gambia. ECOWAS implementation of this pro-democratic protocol was a 
fundamental reason for their reaction to the situation in The Gambia (Hartmann, Christof et al., 2015). 
Unlike the intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, where there was a larger dispute over the electoral results 
and Ouattara’s legitimacy as president, The Gambian crisis was a little more clear-cut.  
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ECOWAS faced very few challenges in this intervention as there was initiative from both regional 
bodies and international bodies and full consensus about military action between the well-trained, 
and well-equipped Nigerian and Senegalese forces, despite Jammeh’s invitation of additional 
mercenaries.  
There was a full understanding between francophone and anglophone states and basically no hidden 
agender from member states, except for Senegal, which in my opinion should not be deemed as such. 
Senegal is a powerful neighboring country, which naturally would have had certain advantages by 
The Gambia’s restoration of democracy.  Senegal’s geographical location has always been somewhat 
of a threat to Gambia, especially after their inability to establish the Senegambia Confederation 
(1981–1989). Jammeh, also being a difficult neighbor and inhumane leader was a reason for 
Senegal’s readiness to push for a new government, but despite the above, Jammeh had provoked 
Senegal by providing financial aid to the Casamance rebel movement, which posed a threat to the 
Senegalese army and was based on Senegalese territory. Jammeh also encouraged the trafficking of 
weapons and drugs over Senegalese boarders and was the cause of many different occasions of influx 
of refugees into Senegal. Thus, it was no surprise to witness their willingness to assist in ECOWAS 
intervention.  
Although the crisis in Gambia was not a complicated one, ECOWAS still deserves much credit for 
its efforts with this and every other peacekeeping mission participated in. It is the only African 
partnership that has been determined to meet African security challenges, proving that Africa is in 
the position to address its own challenges independently.  
ECOWAS intervention in The Gambia sends a powerful message and a good example of the emerging 
concept of “African solutions to African problems”.  
I would however, like to highlight one reoccurring matter within ECOWAS that I feel should be 
addressed, and that is the role of Nigeria within the peacekeeping mechanism.  
In all three cases, while many West African states debated on the relevance of the regional 
peacekeeping forces, Nigeria has always been eager to participate. Nigeria, with its “hegemonious” 
desire, has managed to place its self in a leadership role with its substantial contributions to 
ECOWAS, such as provision of a majority of funding, military forces, political leadership and 
logistics for peacekeeping operations. Her active role has placed her in the heart of the regions peace 
and security missions, whereby changes in domestic government have had implications on West 
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African policy, which has over time, moved from direct military intervention to a more diplomatic 
method of mediation. If Nigeria’s resources continue to remain vital ECOWAS, then its prospects 
will continue to remain tied to Nigeria and her capacity to do away with the autonomous style of 
diplomacy while showing her ability to reach clear, strategic and rational decisions regarding West 
African policies.  
Nigeria might not have had an agender in the case of Gambia but the same cannot be said about its 
involvement in other interventions.   
5.7 Final overview of proposals for future actions of ECOWAS 
Socioeconomic challenges in the region and post-cold war changes in the international system have 
all played a role in affecting the level of security in the region. ECOWAS has to look beyond just 
peacekeeping in its effort to stabilize the region.  
Firstly, the issue of the role played by the international community in supporting ECOWAS peace 
missions must be reevaluated. Should ECOWAS always accept support from the international 
community, or should ECOWAS be more careful when accepting assistance from the international 
community? There is a need to be aware of the quid pro quo attitude that could arise during such 
interactions.  Prior to any acceptance of aid, careful negotiations should take place.  
Conflict prevention should be considered over peacekeeping missions. In Africa, coups d'état, ballot 
rigging and the extension of a president’s term through constitutional amendments, contributes to 
over 80 per cent of regional conflicts and consequently brings with its consistent threats to the region’s 
security. ECOWAS should take advantage of all strategies developed for identifying possible regional 
conflicts and implement conflict prevention operations as a main strategy for conflict management. 
Properly executed conflict prevention programs will reduce costs to the organization as well as 
encourage nations not to resort to violence first.  
Recognizing, resolving, containing and defusing of conflicts should be done first and foremost 
unanimously and without a hidden agender, for maintain the security of the region is essential to the 
region’s own wellbeing and survival. ECOWAS member states need to focus more on what unites 
them instead of what divides them. The lack of unity among member states breeds disrespect, anger 
and eventually the inability to act together with a common goal, creating an avenue for international 
bodies to take the wheel. There is the need for rational evaluation and implementation of decisions. 
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ECOWAS needs to be taken recognized by non-African actors and this can only be achieved if all 
parties take each other seriously.  
In recent years, the liberal-democratic form of government which is practiced in West Africa is being 
criticized and its legitimacy being question. Most likely due to the increasing inflow of the Chinese 
workforce and their ideology into Africa. A strong and clear message, defending the principals of 
liberal democracy has to be made, and ECOWAS and African leaders, needs to reevaluate and take 
ownership for their important roles, not only in the region, but the whole continent. 
5.8 Conclusion  
Drawing from the above, I can make the conclusion that, there were similarities and differences 
between all three interventions discussed in this thesis. There were disagreements regarding the 
legality of ECOWAS intervention in each case, as well as challenges with location of funding, 
logistics, preparation, initiative, command, impartiality and neutrality. The figure below highlights 
some challenges faced during all three interventions.  
Challenges Liberia Sierra Leone Gambia 
Disagreement among member states Yes Yes No 
Weak political will Yes No No 
Support of factions by member states Yes No Yes 
Poor force generation Yes No No 
Poor preparation Yes Yes No 
Inadequate Funding Yes Yes No 
Difficulty in Command and Control Yes Yes No 
Poor logistics Yes Yes No 
81 
Weak institutional capacity Yes Yes No 
Lack of objectivity Yes Yes No 
Lack of neutrality Yes No No 
Nigeria’s domination in intervention 
operations 
Yes Yes Yes 
Support from the international 
community 
No Yes Yes 
UN intervention take over Yes Yes No 
Figure 4: Comparison of the challenges incurred by ECOWAS during the three interventions 
 
ECOWAS took steps to acknowledge and address some of these challenges before conducting any 
subsequent intervention. The UN also played a big role in ECOWAS interventions, this was because 
of a lack in ECOWAS’ intervention capabilities in Liberia and Sierra Leone. A role that exposed 
ECOWAS troops to a new method of facilitating an end to conflicts but in turn, allowed UN 
peacekeepers to take the recognition that came along with every success. This repetitive collaboration, 
as successful as it was, showed that the concept of “African solutions to African problems”, which is 
at the most basic level, a manifestation of regional organizations to claim a prominent role in the 
prevention and resolution of conflict in their respective regions, still requires international support 
and validity (Nathan, 2013). 
In terms of the regulation of regional security, ECOWAS has contributed greatly. Even before 1993, 
when the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and 
strengthening of good neighborliness was added to the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS as a fundamental 
principal. Since then, ECOWAS has been faced with many security challenges brought about by the 
unstable region and has managed to handle each situation effectively through strategies developed 
for identifying, monitoring, and responding to regional conflicts. This was verified by comparing 
three critical case studies, with Liberia and Sierra Leone representing the manner in which ECOWAS 
responsed to conflicts during the post-Cold War era, and Gambia, representing ECOWAS’ progress 
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in its peace and security architecture in the present day. This method of analyzing ECOWAS’ 
evolution allows us to identify various conditions, challenges and dynamics that the regional 
organization has faced.  
There have been many protocols signed throughout the years, such as, the Protocol on Non-
Aggression (1978), the Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defense of 1981 and even the Supplementary 
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 but none of these have been as detailed and 
extensive as the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security of 1999.  
For the purpose of realizing these protocols, ECOWAS has established institutions and legal 
developments such as Early Warning and Response Network, ECOWAS Standby Force, the 
Mediation and Security Council and ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. Therefore, 
ECOWAS states have developed a more structured and comprehensive system for ensuring regional 
security, thus allowing for a better mechanism for conflict prevention and management. The 
organization has a clear understanding of what is required to achieve regional stability, and they 
recognize that the challenges they face today will be overcome in time.   
Finally, looking at the combination of previous interventions, the intervention in The Gambia shows 
an increase in the organizations level of acceptance and recognition of democratic legitimacy, hence 
creating more avenue for intervention by invitation, which is a right of every democratically elected 
government. This also applies to governments that do not have control over the country and/or are 
not residing in the country due to security threats, as was in the case of Barrow.  
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